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Abstract
The September Crisis: The Supreme Court and the Anti-Terrorism Act
Since Bill C- 36 became law in December 2001 there has been 
widespread speculation that it is destined to come before the Supreme 
Court of Canada. There are many portions of the Bill that seem to 
contravene the Charter to an extent that may not be justified in a free 
and democratic society. What would the Court do if it heard a 
challenge to the amendments in Bill C-36? This thesis argues that the 
Court would take issue with several sections of the Act and strike down 
these constitutionally offensive portions. The McLachlin court, while 
perhaps not as activist as the Lamer and Dickson courts, would still act 
to protect legal Charter rights. The established institutional history of 
the Court weighs heavily on the side of protection of legal and equality 
rights. A study of the academic writings and some of the past 
decisions provide insight into the type of judge Madam Chief Justice 
Beverly McLachlin is and how she would decide a case involving Bill 
C-36 in the context of protecting the legal and equality rights contained 
in the Charter. The McLachlin Court will err on the side of the 
institutional history rather than uphold the Government’s poorly and 
hastily drafted response to the events of September 1 2 0 0 1 .
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Introduction
With passing of Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2001, the 
Canadian government signaled that it had taken the terrorist threat seriously 
and that it had acted decisively to protect Canadians from the type of attack 
that shook the United States on September 11'*^  2001.
Bill C-36 is, at least in part, Canada’s response to the global threat of 
terrorism. It consists of several amendments to the Criminal Code with 
respect to the definition of a terrorist offence or terrorist activity, the type of 
steps that can be taken when a terrorist offence or terrorist activity (planning/ 
financing a terrorist offence) is committed or suspected. These steps include 
preventative arrest and investigative hearings. The Bill also amends the 
Official Secrets Act in order to ensure that evidence collected is able to 
remain secret in order to preserve the security of Canada and other countries’ 
intelligence networks. Bill C-36 also contains amendments to the Canada 
Evidence Act in order to ensure that some of the same pieces of intelligence 
evidence remain secret or are subject to limited disclosure in the interest of 
public safety and security. In addition Bill C-36 also amended the Proceeds 
of Crime (Money Laundering) Act in order to improve the Crown’s ability to 
choke off funding of terrorist organization; Finally, the Bill also amended 
select sections of the Access to Information Act, Canadian Human Rights Act, 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, Corrections and Conditional 
Release Act, Federal Court Act, Firearms Act and the National Defence Act in
order to bring them into line with, and to support, the more sweeping 
amendments to the other pieces of legislation mentioned above. The idea 
was to create a useful tool that would give the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities the ability to monitor, charge and prosecute 
individuals and groups that were knowingly involved in planning, executing 
and financing terrorist activity.
Bill C-36 was enacted very quickly with comparatively little debate and 
has major ramifications for all Canadians and the protection of their legal 
rights contained in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The goal of this 
thesis is to study Bill C-36 from its inception and to try and determine what 
those ramifications are or could be. This is important in order to anticipate 
how the courts will rule in a case involving Bill C-36. The argument that this 
thesis makes is that if the Supreme Court of Canada heard a case involving a 
Charter challenge of Bill C-36, in the context of legal theory, case law and due 
to the character of the court, it would not uphold the law as enacted.
This thesis is divided into four sections. First, this thesis will employ 
Kingdon’s theory of policy windows to analyze the policy and to illustrate how 
it was created, where it came from and what potential problems were 
exposed with the Bill. Second, this thesis will look at what portions of the Bill 
could be interpreted as inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Third, this thesis will look at precedent set by the Supreme Court 
of Canada regarding the relevant legal and equality rights sections contained 
in sections 7 through 15 of the Charter. The thesis will also as examine the
personality and opinions of the Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin which are 
contained in her past decisions and the ever growing body of media coverage 
discussing her role in the Court, in order to theorize what type of decision the 
court may reach in this case. Finally, the thesis will examine the options 
open to the Court for disposition of a Charter challenge to Bill C-36.
While the stated reason for the timely passage of the Bill was to protect 
Canada from a terrorist threat, there is some compelling evidence that 
economics and the need to show the United States that Canada was acting to 
fight the terrorist threat played a significant part in the swift passage of the 
legislation.
While it is true that the Minister of Justice at the time, Anne McLellan 
stated that the legislation had been “Charter-proofed,” there are still several 
areas of the legislation that appear to be unconstitutional on their face.^ If 
these offending portions of the legislation were identified in a Charter 
challenge one could argue that they would be found to be unconstitutional 
and not justified as reasonable limits in a free and democratic society. As a 
result, they would need to be altered or struck down in total.
Chapter One of this thesis uses a policy analysis, framed by 
John Kingdon’s theory of policy creation that relies on the opening of policy 
windows, to look at the types of pressure, from foreign and domestic sources, 
on Canadian policy makers to pass such a bill. Kingdon’s theory is valuable 
for two reasons. First, there are many different theories that explain the 
process of policy creation. Theorists like Charles Lindblom argue that the
 ^ The National Post, October 16, 2001, Section A01
policy-making process is not rational but incremental and the best that policy 
makers can do is “muddle through.”  ^This means that there is no time when 
policy can be formulated and embraced in complete form, as Kingdon’s 
theory seems to suggest. Other theories, like Paul Press’ theory of policy 
communities, are quite complicated and have several actors.  ^ Kingdon’s 
model has been used by Brian W. Tomlin in a Canadian policy context to 
outline how Canada’s policy on banning landmines was created. Tomlin 
outlines the three policy streams of Kingdon’s model and identifies the policy 
entrepreneurs who drove the policy process‘d.
Kingdon’s theory is easy to operationalize since it is largely concerned 
with one actor and is comprised of three policy windows, the problem window, 
the policy window and the political window, and the opening of each window 
allows for policy creation and implementation. The main actor in his theory is 
the “policy entrepreneur”, who creates and lobbies for the implementation of 
their policy alternative. In each stream there are always several policy 
entrepreneurs each espousing a particular policy alternative or solution to a 
problem. In this case the political will was driven by crisis circumstances.
Second, Kingdon’s policy-making model is especially useful in 
explaining the creation of policy in response to a crisis situation, as was the 
case after September 11“". This is true because the theory is simple and 
allows for a ready-made policy to be offered. If there were a multitude of
 ^ Leslie A. Pal, Beyond Policy Analysis, 2"  ^ed, (Scarborough: Nelson, 2001), p. 21.
 ^See Paul Press, Group Politics and Public Policy, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992) 
Brian W . Tomlin, “On A Fast Track To A Ban: The Canadian Policy Process”, To Walk 
Without Fear: The Global Movement To Ban Landmines, Eds, Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert 
J. Lawson and Brian W . Tomlin (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.185-207
actors involved In creation of policy after the problem exists then the policy 
creation process would look much more like Lindblom says and would be a 
matter of muddling through. This would be fine if the problem event was 
simply a routine renewal of a contract. But if there were a crisis situation, 
such as the events of September 2001, there is not time to muddle 
through the creation of a variety of policy options. Kingdon’s theory supposes 
that there are always solutions floating around just looking for a problem and 
the political will to solve that problem. This is why Kingdon’s theory of policy 
windows is more suited to a crisis situation than most other theories.
In the process of the policy analysis the thesis looks at the political and 
social climate during the policy creation phase of Bill C-36. Since policy is 
not created in a vacuum, this gives context to the debate and creation of the 
Bill, which highlights some of the Charter and civil rights concerns that were 
raised as the Bill was being debated and amended. In order to do this the 
thesis draws on media sources as well as Hansard transcripts of House of 
Commons debates on Bill C-36 and committee submissions to the standing 
committee on justice and human rights.
There are many parts of the Bill that are useful tools for fighting a 
terrorist threat and do not limit rights to an extent that is not justified in a free 
and democratic society. However, there are a few key provisions of the Bill 
that appear to go too far. The likely result of a court challenge would be that 
several significant portions of the Bill would be altered or struck down by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Chapter Two of the thesis goes on to look at the
case law, or institutional history, and apply the precedents contained therein 
to the relevant sections of the Bill and their compatibility with the Charter. 
Chapter Two examines what portions of the Bill seem to represent a limit on a 
Charter right and what sort of case law there is to support or deny that limit as 
justified in a free and democratic society. The Court would have to apply the 
section 1 Oakes test to determine if the legislation meets the criteria of being 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The Oakes test is the 
standard of proof used by the Courts in Canada to measure all legislation that 
limits a Charter right. The test, which resulted from a criminal case, R v. 
Oakes (1986),^ consists of four parts. The first part is that the objective the 
legislation purports to have must be important or pressing and substantial 
enough to justify a limit on a Charter right.® In this case many would argue 
that protection from terrorist activity is an important objective and is, given the 
climate that existed while this Bill was being created and debated, pressing 
and substantial.
The second part of the Oakes test is what is known as the rational 
connection portion of the test. This means that the law must be rationally 
connected to its objective and cannot be based on arbitrary or irrational 
assumptions.^
The third part of the Oakes test is called the minimal impairment, or the 
least drastic means of limiting a Charter right.® This requires that the
 ^A  vO akes (1986), 1. S.C.R. 103
® Peter Hogg. The Constitutional Law of Canada. 4"’ ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), p. 702. 
 ^Hogg, Constitutionai iaw of Canada, p. 702.
® Hogg, Constitutionai iaw of Canada, p. 702.
legislation do only what it has to in order to meet its rationally connected 
objectives. For example, in R v. Sharpe, a case regarding possession of child 
pornography, the Court felt that even if possession of child pornography is 
linked to harm to children, that harm is fully addressed by laws against the 
production and distribution of child pornography.^ Criminalizing mere 
possession adds greatly to the limitation on free expression but adds little 
benefit in terms of harm prevention. The key consideration is what the 
impugned section seeks to achieve beyond what is already accomplished by 
other legislation. If other laws already achieve the goals, new laws limiting 
constitutional rights are unjustifiable. Therefore, in this instance, criminalizing 
mere possession was not the least drastic means to combat child 
pornography and as such failed the minimal impairment portion of the test.
The fourth part of the Oakes test is called proportional effect. This 
means that the way in which the law is applied must not be severe and overly 
limiting even if the other requirements of the test are met. The other sections 
of the test are tests of the legislation but this section is a test of the 
application of that legislation. Although it is considered by some to be 
redundant and simply a restatement of the first section in that if an objective is 
important enough, rationally connected and minimally impairing how can its 
effects be too severe?^° If the effects are too severe then it is likely that the 
objective was not important enough to justify a limit on a Charter right and 
pass as a “pressing and substantial objective.”
® R V. Sharpe (2001), 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 
Hogg, Constitutional law of Canada, p. 722.
The argument in Chapter Two is that the legislation infringes on 
Charter rights in a manner that is not always rationally connected to the 
objectives and is not minimally impairing. The thesis also argues that the 
limits in the legislation also have the potential to fail the proportional effect 
section of the Oakes test in that the results of the application of Bill C-36 may 
be too severe. Laws that are essentially constitutional may still be vague and 
as such applied in a manner that is not what policy makers intended. In other 
words, some pieces of legislation exist that rely on further regulation to 
enforce the spirit of the law. However, there are times when either that 
regulation is not created or is created with a different focus than the 
legislators imagined when they created the original legislation. The result can 
be that the legislation is applied in a manner that infringes on a 
constitutionally protected right due, in part, to the original legislation being too 
vague.
Chapter Three employs Ronald Dworkin’s theory of judicial decision 
making in hard cases to determine, generally speaking, what decision the 
Supreme Court of Canada would produce. Dworkin’s theory is useful in this 
case because his theory presupposes that institutional history or precedent is 
like a road map that can be read to determine where arguments on specific 
issues have come from and where they are going. In the context of Canadian 
jurisprudence on Charter rights the timeline is only twenty years and in that 
time the Courts in Canada have created a roadmap, with a few detours, that 
can be followed. In contrast, the American Courts have had much longer to
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take detours and create bypasses as the justices have attempted to define 
and protect rights that are enshrined in the American Bill of Rights. There are 
other theorists who are critical of Dworkin’s approach and their theories will 
be dealt with in detail in the chapter. However, these theorists are critical of 
Dworkin’s approach to judicial decision-making in the American context 
saying that it is too simplistic and that it assumes order and patterns where 
they do not exist. In that case, the criticisms may be valid. But in the 
Canadian context the passage of time has not yet made it impossible to see 
the road map that is made up of case law and precedent and Dworkin’s 
abstract theory is affirmed by the reality of Canadian judicial decision-making 
and this is why Dworkin’s theory, rather than some other, is the most salient 
to this Canadian example of Bill C-36.
Central to Dworkin’s theory is the idea that the institutional history or 
precedent contained in case law will direct the decision of the court in cases 
where there is an argument of principle, as any Charter case would certainly 
be. A challenge to Bill C-36 would be based on an accepted principle of a 
legal right contained in the Charter and the past case law decisions on the 
Charter.
Dworkin’s theory is also useful in that it not only takes into account the 
institutional history of the court but the way in which the judge reads or uses 
that history in deciding the case at hand. Judges do not all read the 
institutional history the same way and in some cases may ignore it completely 
if they are determined to break from past decisions on an issue. Dworkin’s
theory provides a loose criterion for categorizing what type of judges sit on 
the Supreme Court and by extension what type of decisions they will make 
based on their reading of the institutional history contained in case law.
Chapter Four of the thesis goes on to determine what sort of justice the 
current Chief Justice, Beverly McLachlin is by applying Dworkin’s criteria for 
classifying judges. The thesis argues that McLachlin CJ would defer to the 
institutional history of the Court or precedent in a case involving Bill C-36. 
Chapter Four also applies Peter McCormick’s argument that the CJ can set 
the tone for the Court by virtue of her position. The makeup of the current 
court as well as examples of McLachlin’s own personal charisma and history 
from various sources can categorize what type of justice she is within the 
confines of Dworkin’s theory. McCormick’s argument is that it is better to be 
the CJ than not, because there are several advantages that are inherent to 
the position that allow the CJ, if they choose use these advantages, to set the 
tone for the rest of the Court with respect to decision-making. McCormick’s 
argument also includes some comment on the makeup of the current 
Supreme Court of Canada and McLachlin’s personal style, both of which 
affords her with some power over and above the power inherent to her 
position. The purpose of using this argument is to demonstrate that while 
Dworkin’s theory that the personality of judges informs their decision-making 
could be applied to any judge on any court in Canada it is logical to choose 
the Chief Justice of the highest court in the land as a test case for the reasons 
listed above.
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In the Conclusion, the research questions are answered and the types 
of remedy that the Court would most likely employ are presented. In order to 
answer the research questions mentioned in the previous chapters the 
conclusions are drawn together to support the thesis that the Court will find 
Bill C-36 unconstitutional.
The second part of the Conclusion is a presentation of alternatives that 
the Court may use to dispose of a Charter case involving the Oakes test. 
Schacter v. Canada is known as the remedies case and has been used as a 
general roadmap to determine what type of remedy is appropriate for the 
disposal of a case involving a Charter challenge and the use of the section 
one Oakes’ test.
The Conclusion goes on to make some predictions about how the 
legislative community might react to the alteration or striking down of Bill C- 
36. The constitutional options that are available are somewhat limited but 
nonetheless very powerful.
Summary
This research is important for at least four reasons. One, a review of 
Bill C-36 has had only minimal treatment by academia.”  The main reason for 
this is that there have been no cases involving Bill C-36 to analyze and 
academics have reserved judgment until such time as there is more concrete 
information to study. This thesis will be one of the first analyses of the
”  Daniels, Ronald J., Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach, eds. The Security of Freedom: 
Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Biii. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001)
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legislation and its impact on Charter rights albeit devoid of a real Charter 
challenge to analyze.
Two, if our Charter rights are important to us as citizens then studying 
the ramifications that this legislation has on several of those rights is also 
important. Limiting rights in order to secure protection and order is something 
that should not be taken lightly. In the case of Bill C-36 this thesis will give a 
snapshot of what may happen if there is a challenge to the legislation with the 
additional advantage of dealing with several diverse sections of both the 
Charter and the legislation. The judicial system is such that problems with Bill 
C-36 would most likely not be dealt with in a single, or perhaps in multiple, 
court challenges. It would be improbable that a single case would come 
along that would allow the Courts to make decisions on all of the offending 
portions of the legislation. The power that the Courts’ possess is reactive 
power, which requires them to be asked to decide the constitutionality of 
legislation. As it is unlikely that the Court could render a decision on all of the 
problematic provisions of the legislation, this thesis vests the Court with the 
proactive power to decide on all of the portions of the legislation that are 
incompatible with the Charter in one hypothetical instance in order to yield a 
coherent decision.
Three, this thesis is important because it sets out two rational models 
that can be employed in a policy analysis of any piece of legislation.
However, despite employing these rational models, the end result of 
jurisprudence may well turn out to be irrational. This does not reduce the
12
value of the models presented in this thesis; in fact, the rationality of the result 
is largely beside the point and leads to the fourth point.
Regardless of whether or not a decision is a rational response or an 
irrational response from the Courts, this thesis illustrates that policy makers 
need to understand the importance of the role they play in the process. The 
thesis provides a warning that hastily drafted policy which may limit the rights 
of Canadians without valid justification may lead directly to the Courts. Policy 
makers need to take note that legislation that may have been drafted to bring 
stability can do the opposite when jurisprudence spins out of control. The 
message to policy makers is to ensure that the legislation is constitutional 
during the policy making process and take the duty of creating legislation that 
limits rights, where justifiable, seriously. Protecting rights is as much a 
function of policy makers as it is of the courts.
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Chapter One 
Policy Analysis using Kingdon’s model of “Policy Windows”
In order to predict what the Supreme Court of Canada might do with a 
case involving the Anti-Terrorism Act it is important to understand what the 
social and political climate was like in the days and weeks following 
September 11, 2001. To facilitate this understanding John Kingdon’s model 
of policy creation will be used to frame the debate. This chapter will illustrate 
that Bill C-36 was created, debated and passed quite quickly. Due to this 
fact, there are several portions of the Bill that may not have come under the 
level of scrutiny necessary to ensure that a proper balance was struck 
between security and preservation of legal. Charter rights. First, this chapter 
will outline Kingdon’s model. Second, Kingdon’s model will be applied to Bill 
C-36 to illustrate how the bill was created and what forces contributed to the 
substance of the resulting policy. Finally, this chapter examines the 
amendments that were added to the Bill after the committee stage.
Kingdon’s Model of Policy Analysis
This section will present the portions of Kingdon’s model that are 
salient to the policy analysis of Bill C-36. It will begin with an explanation of 
the two types of agenda that Kingdon employs. Then it will provide a 
definition and explanation of the three types of policy windows as well as a
14
definition and explanation of the role of the main actor in Kingdon’s model, the 
policy entrepreneur.
Agendas
Kingdon argues that governments operate with two types of agenda: 
the governmental agenda and the decision agenda. The governmental 
agenda is the broad strokes of what the government hopes to accomplish 
over the long term. It is comprised of a list of subjects and issues that are 
getting the attention of the government.^^ Part of this larger list of issues is 
the decision agenda. This list of issues consists of subjects that are up for 
active decision-making. In other words the list consists of issues on which the 
government is prepared to make some sort of d e c is io n . I t  is important to 
note the difference between the two types of agenda. As will be argued 
below, the need for anti-terrorism legislation was present prior to September 
11, 2001 and in its most abstract form it was part of the overall governmental 
agenda probably under the heading “security concerns.” However, after 
September 11, 2001 the need for anti-terrorism legislation moved to the top of 
the decision agenda where a solution was actively sought and decisions were 
actively made.
John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Pollcles (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1984), p. 4.
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 4.
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Policy Windows
Kingdon theorizes that there are three policy windows that must open 
for a policy to be created. The first window is the problem window, the 
second window is the political window and the third window is called the 
policy w in d o w .T h e  problem window opens when there is a new problem 
that arises or an old problem takes on new importance. Sometimes the 
problem window opens on a routine basis as in the case of a program 
renewal.^® Kingdon states that for each problem that exists there is a person 
or group that he calls a policy entrepreneur who is pushing to have some sort 
of policy created to deal with their pet problem.^® When the problem window 
opens that policy entrepreneur must be ready to present a policy alternative 
or solution to solve the problem at hand. Kingdon states that these windows 
do not stay open very long and as such require that the policy entrepreneurs 
be ready well in advance to push their policy alternative.’  ^ In order to do this 
the policy entrepreneur plays a significant role in what Kingdon calls coupling. 
That is when the problem stream is coupled with either the political stream or 
the policy stream. The policy entrepreneur must be able to rally the political 
support in order to demonstrate to the policy makers that it is politically 
possible to implement the policy alternative espoused by the entrepreneur.
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 173. 
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 195. 
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 188. 
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 190.
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This also is the case when the problem and policy streams couple
together. The policy stream can open and a policy entrepreneur can present
a solution to a problem and then go searching for the political support for that
policy solution. At some point all three windows are open and are coupled
and this is largely the result of luck and the groundwork laid in advance by the
policy entrepreneur.^®
Therefore, in order for a policy to become reality there needs to be a
problem that opens the problem window. Then there needs to be a policy
entrepreneur who can either bring to bear political support or convince the
policy makers to put it on the decision agenda if he can find the political
support. The result is that if everything goes according to plan a policy will be
created and the policy entrepreneur will have solved the problem using his
proposal or policy alternative. Kingdon writes,
One key coupling is that of a policy alternative to something else. 
Entrepreneurs who advocate their pet alternatives are responsible for 
this coupling. They keep their proposals ready, waiting for one of two 
things: a problem that might float by to which they can attach their 
solution, or a development in the political stream, such as a change of 
administration, that provides a receptive climate for their proposal. 
Some windows open largely on a schedule; others are quite 
unpredictable. But a window closes quickly. Opportunities come, but 
they also pass. If a chance is missed, another must be awaited.^®
In relation to policy windows and their effect on the governmental and
decision agendas Kingdon writes.
While governmental agenda is set by events in either the problems or 
political streams, setting of decision agendas emphasizes, in addition, 
an available alternative. A worked-out, viable proposal, available in the 
policy stream, enhances the odds that a problem will rise on a decision
Kingdom, Agendas, p. 190.
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 204.
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agenda. In other words, the probability of an item rising on a decision 
agenda is dramatically increased if all three elements - problem, 
proposal, and political receptivity - are coupled in a single package.^®
It is apparent that the policy entrepreneur has a significant role to play in the 
creation of policy. What appears on the decision agenda is, according to 
Kingdon, almost entirely due to the efforts of the entrepreneur to present a 
viable policy alternative. If we apply Kingdon’s model to Bill C-36 we are able 
to show how the Bill was created and identify the policy entrepreneurs. 
Kingdon’s model is useful in analyzing this policy because, as mentioned 
above, it is particularly helpful in describing the policy creation process in the 
face of a crisis situation, as the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 most 
certainly was. Not only was there a crisis in security there was, as will be 
argued later in thesis, also a potential economic crisis.
Applying Kingdon’s Model to Bill C-36 
What is Bill C-36?
Bill 0-36 is a piece of legislation that makes several amendments to 
the Criminal Code of Canada, the Canada Evidence Act, The Officiai Secrets 
Act and various other acts. When Justice Minister Anne McLellan tabled the 
bill on October 15, 2001 she outlined what the aims of the bill were to 
suppress the very existence of terrorist groups, to provide new investigative
^  Kingdon, Agendas, p. 204.
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tools and to provide a tougher sentencing regime to incapacitate terrorists 
and terrorist groups.^^
The Problem Window:
What problem opened the window and allowed for a policy 
entrepreneur to attach his alternative policy? It seems obvious that the 
events of September 11*^  2001 galvanized policy makers into creating this 
legislation. Terrorism is not a new concern for Canada. Canadian Security 
and Intelligence Service (CSIS) has kept track of terrorist organizations 
operating in Canada for several decades,however, there has never been a 
comprehensive anti-terrorist law to deal with that threat. Also Canada has 
signed two separate international accords, the Suppression of Terrorist 
Financing and the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and they were ratified in 
Bill C-36. In fact. Justice Minister Anne McLellan presented this as one of the 
reasons for the creation of the legislation.^^ However, until September 11*^  it 
was not on the decision agenda of the Canadian Government to ratify these 
conventions into law. This is evidenced by the comments in the House by 
Canadian Alliance MP Vic Toews the day the Bill was tabled. He stated.
The bill being tabled today is an important step forward and reflects 
many of the issues the Canadian Alliance has been raising over the 
past years. The bill echoes many recommendations made by 
Canadian Alliance members of parliament, including the identification 
of terrorist organizations, the ratification of international obligations to
Hansard, House of Commons debates. Vol. 137. Number 094.1® session. 37 Parliament. 
October 15'*' 2001, p. 6048
^  Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, Public Reports, online® http://www.csis- 
scrs.qc.ca/enq/publicrp/pubreps e.html accessed July 26, 2003 
Hansard, House of Commonslfebates, Vol. 137. Number 095.1®* session 37*'^  Parliament. 
October 16'^ 2001, p. 6165.
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suppress terrorist bombings, and banning fundraising activities that 
support terrorism. As recently as September 18 our party introduced a 
supply motion putting forth a number of the same elements Bill C-36 
introduces. The motion unfortunately was voted down as the 
government accused the Canadian Alliance of playing politics or trying 
to score political points.
Bill C-36 is a result of a problem that suddenly became pressing and required
action. The need for legislation like this policy existed before September 11*'^
but was not seen as pressing. Further, as mentioned above CSIS has kept
track of the terrorist threat for several years and have demanded policy that
would allow the organization to effectively fight the perceived domestic
terrorist threat.Therefore  it seems clear that the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon galvanized Canadian policy makers.
This new sense of urgency was only partially due to the need to protect
Canada from a terrorist attack. The most likely reason the “problem window”
opened was Canada’s need to restore the confidence of the United States
that Canada was dealing with identified terrorist elements with legislation that
was proactive and substantive. There are two compelling pieces of evidence
to support this view.
The first compelling piece of evidence is that in the days and weeks
immediately following the attacks the American media portrayed Canada as a
terrorist haven. The Seattle Times printed a story that was filled with quotes
like; “[ejxperts on both sides of the 4,000-mile border say the nation to the
north is a haven for terrorists, and that the U.S.-Canada line is little more
Hansard, October 16'^ 2001, p. 6167.
CSIS, Public Reports, online® http://www.csis-scrs.qc.ca/enq/publicrp/pubreps e.html 
last accessed July 26, 2003.
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barrier than ink on a map.” ®^ The Wall Street Journal had a story entitled, 
“Threat From The North: Canada needs to toughen up on terrorists.” This 
story contained many references to Canada as being a haven for terrorists 
and statements to the effect that Canada does not have the will to do 
anything about the terrorist cells that operate within Canada.^^ The New York 
Times also printed a story that stated, “[s]everal recent investigations of 
Canadian terror suspects underscore what are widely perceived in the United 
States as weaknesses in the Canadian system.” ®^ This story also lent 
weight to the idea that Bill C-36 was created in part to dispel the perception 
that Canada was a terrorist haven. As was noted in the New York Times, 
“faced with persistent and increasingly uncomfortable accusations that it has 
become an unwitting haven for terrorists, Canada is trying to shift its laws and 
practices to ease tensions with its neighbor.” ®^ These are just some 
examples of the type of stories that demonstrate the perception that Canada 
needed to do something about their laws in order to keep something like 
September 11**^  from happening again, even though there was no evidence 
uncovered that the September 11*'^  terrorists came to be in the United States 
via Canada.
^  “Few Resources Spent Guarding Canada Border”. Seattle Times online edition archive, 23 
September 2001 Online® O n line® http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cai- 
bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=border23m0&date=20010923, last accessed April 3, 
2002.
Mary O ’Grady, “The Threat from the North” Wall Street Journal, 14 September 2001. 
Online® http://www.opinionjournal.com/wsj/?id=95001129, last accessed April 7, 2002. 
^^Anthony DePalma, “ Security Concerns: Canada Altering its System of Vigilance against 
Terror” New York Times, 3 December 2001. Online ®
http://www.northamericaninstitute.ora/articlearcive/nvtimes120301.htm. last accessed April 7, 
2002.
^  DePalma, “Security Concerns”, New York Times
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Immediately after the attacks US government officials began to speak 
about strengthening borders and during their press briefings suggested that 
Canada’s weak policies may have allowed some terrorist to slip into the 
United States. Prime Minister Chretien’s statements in the House of 
Commons on October 16'^ lend some weight to the argument that keeping the 
border open and economic concerns had a lot to do with the creation of Bill C- 
36. He answered a question about border security from Canadian Alliance 
MP, Rahim Jaffer by saying, “the President of the United States told me that it 
was [in] the interests of Canada and of the United States that the free flow of 
goods at the border be accommodated quickly.” °^
The media also began to immediately draw parallels between the 1999 
arrest of Ahmad Ressam, the so-called millennium bomber, at a border 
checkpoint trying to enter the United States from Canada.^^ The United 
States also sought to secure some agreements with Canadian officials that 
there would be some action taken in order to improve immigration and 
security laws. This rhetoric created by the American media fostered the 
perception that the Canada was soft on known terrorist groups and 
constituted another reason that Canadian policy makers needed to act 
quickly. Anthony DePalma, author of the New York Times article mentioned 
above, sums up the situation this way, “Canadian officials, who have been
^  Hansard, House of Commons debates, October 16"  ^2001, p. 6197.
Few Resources Spent Guarding Canada Border” Seattle Times online edition archive, 23 
September 2001
^  “U.S. Plans Stronger Border Security”. Washington Post 2 December 2001. Online©  
http://www.washinqtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dvn?paqename=article&node=&contentld=A43948- 
2001 Peel
22
fighting false rumors that some of the Sept. 11 terrorists crossed the border 
from Canada, hope the tough new law will prove that Canada is serious about 
fighting terrorism.”^^  This idea was echoed in Canada by Vic Toews in the 
House of Commons when he said, “we let down our American allies who 
suffered a terrible tragedy in New York City. It is one thing to say now that we 
stand shoulder to shoulder with the Americans, which we do, but it is quite 
another to have not come to that realization that it was our obligation to do 
that prior to the horrific events of September 11
The second piece of evidence is that, in addition to the comments of 
the Prime Minister above, another top Canadian official admitted that 
economics played a principal role in the creation of Bill C-36 in a speech to 
students at Mount Allison University. John Manley, who was at the time 
Foreign Affairs’ Minister, conceded that Canadian policy makers were held as 
economic hostages. He is quoted as saying “[i]f the United States decides it's 
worried ... then we've got a problem;” and, “we could certainly not ignore the 
concerns that our best customer had. When one customer buys 87 per cent 
of your product, if that customer has a concern, whether you think it's real or 
not, it's your concern.”^^  However, he hastened to add that he does not 
believe Canadians “should take actions simply to satisfy the United States.”®®
^  DePalma, “Security Concerns”, New York Times 
Hansard, House of Commons debates, October 15"’ 2001, p. 6048.
Jennifer Robinson, “Ottawa had to listen to U.S. security fears because of economics: 
Manley”. Yahoo News online @ http://ca.news.vahoo.com/020112/6/qvb2.htmI accessed 
April 8, 2002.
^  Robinson, “Ottawa”, Yahoo News
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Regardless of Manley’s last statement it seems plausible that this is what 
occurred in the case of Bill C-36.
Based on the information presented above it can be suggested that the 
problem, which opened the window, was not just terrorism but the economic 
effects of the terrorist acts committed on September 2001. Certainly, 
combating terrorism in the wake of the attacks was of great importance. 
However, this was not as pressing as the Canadian government’s desire to 
be perceived by the United States as pro-active and, for want of a better word 
“busy.”
The Political Window:
Another of the policy windows that must be opened is the political 
window. Generally speaking there are problems floating around all the time 
that compete to be solved based on their perceived importance. It could be 
argued that until September 1 terrorism and how to deal with it was one of 
those problems. In any case, in order for a problem to be solved through 
policy creation a certain amount of political will is required. There needs to be 
a person or group Kingdon calls the policy entrepreneur Xo exert the political 
will to solve the p r o b l e m . I n  other words, a group or a person, in the context 
of the Canadian system I would argue a bureaucrat or lobbyist with access to 
policy makers^®, has to be eager to develop a policy that solves a problem
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 183.
This aiso fits with Tomlin’s reading of Kingdon in his analysis Canada’s landmine policy. 
He identifies the policy entrepreneurs as bureaucrats and lobbyists with access. See Tomlin, 
pp.188, 207
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that exists or will exist in the future. The policy entrepreneur then tries to 
present the current or upcoming problem as pressing enough to warrant 
policy maker’s attention. As mentioned above, Kingdon suggests that for 
every problem there is at least one entrepreneur who advocates for some sort 
of policy creation. However, until there is sort of critical mass of political 
support that problem will simply continue to sit on the policy back burner and 
never reach the decision agenda. This seemed to be the case with previous 
calls for powers to aid in the fight against terrorism as we did not have any 
sort of anti-terror provisions in existence outside the general application of 
what is already contained in the Criminal Code. The political will did not 
reach the critical mass mentioned above required to solve the problem until 
the terrorist attacks of September 11**^ .
In most cases there is the expectation of a suitable level of broad 
based grassroots popular support required for a bill in order for it to be 
created.®^ However, in this case there did not seem to be any grassroots 
support from the majority of the electorate. There was one, and only one, 
public opinion poll put in the field between October 2- 4. This poll consisted 
of asking 1000 people from each province in Canada a series of general 
questions on terrorism and Charter rights. The result was that 58 percent of
^  Admittedly, sometimes bills, such as Bill C-68 the Gun Control bill, which do not enjoy 
broad based national appeal, but do enjoy regional appeal within the populous urban centers 
of central Canada, are introduced and passed.
25
Canadians felt that fighting terrorism currently outweighed the protection of 
civil rights such as due process or privacy rights."^”
In the days and weeks after Sept.11 there were few articles in the print 
media, editorial or otherwise that called for any type of anti-terrorism bill/^
The only media stories that addressed due process and privacy rights in 
relation to this Bill were those discussing the poll mentioned above which was 
sponsored by The Globe and Mail and GTV. It could be said that the poll 
results were a type of grassroots support, but this poll was conducted in the 
absence of any actual proposed legislation. A poll that would have asked 
people about Bill 0-36 specifically may have shown different results. Further, 
even if we allow that this could have been called a mandate for protection 
from terrorist activity in Canada the context in which the poll was taken would 
make that mandate limited to consultations and rigorous debate, not the quick 
response that created Bill C-36. Bill C-36 was created and passed in under 
three months but not, it seems, because there was a call for it in the media or 
by the population of Canada.
The potential economic consequences of a long closure of the 
Canada-US border and the corresponding loss of American confidence also 
galvanized the domestic business lobby to press government for some type of 
solution in order to show the Americans that something was being done. The
“Majority (58%) say terrorism threats outweigh protection of individual rights, freedom and 
due process of law: Police intelligence officials should get tools they need to protect collective 
safety of Canadians against terrorism.” Online® http://www.iosos-reid.com/ca/index.cfm 
accessed February 4, 2002.
In examinations of most national newspapers as well as some regional newspapers like 
the Toronto Star and the Calgary Herald, there were no articles or editorials that called for a 
comprehensive anti terrorism bill.
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Canadian Chamber of Commerce as well as several other business actors 
and associations needed a government solution sooner rather than later and 
implored policy makers to do whatever needed to be done to improve the 
situation/^
In order for the problem and political windows to open the policy 
stream a coupling must occur/^ This means that simply having a problem 
with no political will to solve it will not allow the policy window to open and a 
solution to the problem to emerge as a policy. The windows must be open at 
the same time and couple to solve the problem at hand.
Kingdon suggests that policy windows do not stay open very long and 
when the opportunity is there it must be taken."*"* For several years CSIS had 
been warning the government that terrorism is on the rise and that CSIS 
needed funding to properly collect intelligence."*^ Each year the organization 
put out a threat report on terrorism and each year its implications went more 
or less ignored by policymakers, which is evidenced by the shrinking 
resources budgeted for the organization."*® However, in the days and weeks 
following Sept. 11 the conditions became right to ask for the powers and 
funding needed to better serve its purpose. In fact, CSIS as well as the 
RCMP and several intelligence and terrorism experts were part of the policy
"*^The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Online 
@http://www.chamber.oa/newDaaes/Dolicv.html. accessed Feb 26, 2002. 
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 181 
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 175 
CSIS. Year 2000 public report, Online®
http://www.csisscrs.qc.ca/enq/publicrp/pub2000 e.html. accessed July 26, 2003  
CSIS, Year 1995 public report, Online®  
http://www.csisscrs.qc.ca/enq/publicrp/pub1997 e.html#19. accessed July 26, 2003
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network and the policy entrepreneurs who helped to formulate Bill C-36 in 
committee hearings.'*^ Further, in order to ensure that the bill not be mired in 
the morass that is political debate the Government limited debate on the 
committee’s amendments during the final reading in the House of Commons, 
the Honourable Dan Boudria moved,
[t]hat in relation to C-36, an act to amend the Criminal Code, the 
Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime 
(Money Laundering) Act and other acts, and to enact measures 
respecting the registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism, not 
more than one further sitting day shall be allotted to the consideration 
of the report stage of the bill and one sitting day shall be allotted to the 
third reading stage of the said bill and fifteen minutes before the expiry 
of the time provided for government business on the day allotted to the 
consideration of the report stage and on the day allotted to the third 
reading stage of the said bill, any proceedings before the House shall 
be interrupted, if required for the purpose of this order, and in turn 
every question necessary for the disposal of the stage of the bill then 
under consideration shall be put forthwith and successively without 
further debate or amendment.'^®
The danger in waiting until the Bill has been exhaustively debated, as it
should have been, is that the political window would have eventually closed
and many of the economic problems that spurred the creation of the Bill
would have become a reality. The government is aware that political debate
is often an endurance contest and in this case they were not prepared to lose
the opportunity to maintain the confidence of the United States.
Parliament of Canada. Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Evidence.47 raiiici t
October 23"  ^2001. Online 
@ http://www.Darl.gc.ca/lnfoComDoc/37/1/JUST/Meetinqs/Evidence/iustev30-e.htm accessed 
Jan 22, 2002. The director of CSIS, Ward Elcock and the Commissioner of the RCMP  
Guiliano Zaccardeili appeared before the Committee to voice their support for the Bill and to 
suggest amendments.
Hansard, House of Commons debates, November 27''  ^2001, p.7532.
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However, invoking existing legislation such as the Emergencies Act 
(the act which replaced the War Measures Act) was also not an attractive 
option politically. The events of October 1970 are still vigorously debated in 
Canadian political and legal circles and the consequences for the federal 
government of evoking such drastic measures would likely have been 
negative. If the attacks of September 11, 2001 had occurred in Canada 
rather than the United States then the matter may have been different. In that 
case, the use of Emergencies Act vjou\6 have been employed as part of the 
government’s overall crisis management plan.
The federal government would also not be anxious to invoke the 
measures contained in the Emergencies Act because it had portrayed the 
terrorist threat as ongoing and argued that Bill C-36 was a required, 
permanent tool for countering the terrorist threat. The Emergencies Act is not 
designed to be in permanent operation. It contains strict criteria with regard 
to when it is applicable or appropriate to be invoked, to be revoked and strict 
reporting criteria to ensure that there are no abuses of fundamental rights.'^®
In short, the Emergencies >4cf contemplates a beginning, middle and end to 
the emergency which triggered its operation, and a return to normalcy. On 
the other hand, with Bill C-36 the federal government sought to redefine 
normalcy in the context of a post-September 11 th world.
The Policy Window:
^  Emergencies Act, R.S. 1985, c.22, 4*^  supp (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1985)
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After September 1 the need for some reaction to the terrorist threats 
and the problems created by it became pressing enough for it to be high on 
the decision agenda. The policy entrepreneurs in the case of Bill C-36 are 
varied and in some respects difficult to identify. In their submissions before 
the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the Director of CSIS, 
Ward Elcock, and the Commissioner of the RCMP, Guiliano Zaccardeili, both 
voiced their support for the Bill and indicated their intention to ask for more 
funding to accomplish the task of fighting terrorism and employing the new 
powers contained in Bill C-36.^° This could be a classic example of policy 
entrepreneurs, in this case the Director of CSIS, Ward Elcock, and the 
Commissioner of the RCMP, Guiliano Zaccardeili offering solution to a 
problem or as Kingdon would argue, “a problem that might float by to which 
they can attach their solution.”^^  However, access to documents pertaining 
to who actually helped draft the bill are limited, but it seems likely that the 
Minister of Justice would have consulted with members of CSIS or the RCMP 
through the Solicitor General in order to find out what was required for the 
task of fighting the terrorist threat. Therefore, it could be suggested that 
members of the counter terrorism and law enforcement community such as 
the Director of CSIS, Ward Elcock, and the Commissioner of the RCMP, 
Guiliano Zaccardeili, were the policy entrepreneurs. The public reports 
released by CSIS each year that call for more resources could be seen as
standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Evidence. October 23^ '^  2001. 
Kingdon, Agendas, p. 204
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“softening up”^^  the policy stream for a time when a problem presented itself 
or a change in the political climate made it possible to act.^^ In their 
2000/2001-performance report the RCMP identifies a lack of funding as one 
of the challenges to their ability to provide good police service and update or 
replace aging equipment.^'* This may also be considered an example of 
softening up the policy stream so that when a problem arises the policy 
alternative presented will deliver the required funds. The fact that during 
submissions to the standing committee both Elcock and Zaccardeili indicated 
that while the money they have received is useful it is “short term money” and 
that they would be asking for more funds to make sure that they could meet 
their new responsibilities.®^ This illustrates that even after Bill 0-36 was 
contemplated and tabled the ROMP and CSIS were both engaged in an 
ongoing attempt to shape the policy even though they had benefited from the 
money its tabling had already generated.
The purpose of this section was to identify the main policy 
entrepreneurs and to illustrate that the terrorist attack on September 11,
2001, both directly for security reasons and indirectly for economic reasons, 
opened Kingdon’s problem window. The policy entrepreneurs sensing that
^  Kingdon, Agendas, p.123, Kingdon’s word for what policy entrepreneurs do while they wait 
for a window to open. It means pushing the merits of the point of view and trying to rally 
political support for their policy alternative.
CSIS website, Public reports 1991-2001 see also “On June 24,1998 , Ward Elcock, 
Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service tabled the following submission to the 
Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence.”
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2000/2001 Performance Report, online @
http://www.rcmp-qrc.ac.ca/dpr/performance01e.pdf accessed July 26, 2003.
Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Evidence, October 
23“^  2001. online® http://www.parl.qc.ca/lnfoComDoc/37/1/JUST/Meetinas/Evi 
dence/justev30- e.htm last accessed Jan 12, 2002
31
the political will existed to solve the problem opened the policy window and 
presented their solution to the problem. With all of the windows open and 
coupled the result was the creation of Bill C-36.
Perceived Problems with Bill C-36
Throughout the creation of the policy there were criticisms of the Bill. 
These criticisms were varied and came from many different groups and 
individuals. For organizational purposes the presentations and /or debates 
will be organized in chronological order starting from the debate in the house 
when it was tabled and finishing with the royal assent.
Criticism in the House of Commons:
In the initial days of debate, during first and second reading, several 
things about Bill C-36 were criticized. Many different members of the 
opposing parties brought to light problems with the Bill that would need to be 
addressed at the committee stage. There was some concern that the 
definition of a terrorist activity was too broad and as such could be used to 
curtail legitimate protests or strikes.^®
There was also concern that several sections involving preventative 
arrest and investigative hearings be subject to a “sunset clause” that would 
make those sections of no force and effect or require a re-enactment and 
review after a period of three years.®^
Hansard, October 16"’ 2001, p. 6197.
Hansard, October 16'" 2001, see comments by Peter MacKay MP (PC) p. 6179.
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The need to protect the legal and equality rights of Canadians was also 
raised as a concern. The sections of preventative arrest and investigative 
hearings could possibly be against a persons legal Charter ngh\s and it was 
hoped that there had been significant attention devoted to making sure that 
the Bill would preserve the Charter rights of Canadians.^® NDP Member of 
Parliament Svend Robinson spoke explicitly about his party’s concerns with 
the legislation and he urged that the Bill be heavily amended in committee 
and he stated that he would not support the Bill in its present form because 
he felt that it went too far with the granting of new police powers which 
“constitute potentially a very grave abuse of civil liberties.’’^ ®
Another area of concern was that the power of review and disclosure 
would be concentrated in the hands of the Attorney General. Also the power 
to conduct electronic surveillance would be concentrated in the hands of the 
Minister of National Defence rather than the Minister of Justice or some sort 
of committee. Mr. Claude Bachand, Bloc Quebecios member from Saint- 
Jean, asked the question “(h)ow can the government justify that the Minister 
of National Defence will be the only one to authorize electronic surveillance 
instead of calling on a judge to obtain such authorization?’’®® He was 
uncomfortable with the prospect that there would be no judicial oversight of 
wiretapping and video surveillance under the provisions in Bill 0-36.
Finally, a major area of concern was that the Bill was drafted very 
hastily and as such did not get the normal level of scrutiny that a Bill its
Hansard, October 16"’ 2001, pp.6195-6196. 
Hansard, October 16'" 2001, p. 6247. 
Hansard, October 16'" 2001, P. 6200.
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magnitude required.®^ The implication was that the Bill was not vigorously 
tested as to its harmony with Charter rights.
Criticisms of the Bill in Committee:
According the Minister of Justice Anne McLellan, the standing
Committee on Justice and Human rights heard over 60 submissions
regarding Bill 0-36.®^ There were several concerns that were voiced by a
variety of organizations and individual presenters. A reading of the minutes
and evidence of the standing committee allows for the presenters to be
divided into two general groups. On one hand there are those who
strenuously support the Bill and on the other those who have serious
reservations about it or do not support it at all. It is no surprise that Ward
Elcock, Director of CSIS, and Guiliano Zaccardeili, Commissioner of the
RCMP, were strongly supportive of the Bill. In their testimony they both felt
that the Bill gave them the financial resources and legislative tools to use in
the fight against terrorism. Mr. Zacardelli stated.
Traditional investigative tools are inadequate. It is our view that Bill C- 
36, the proposed anti-terrorism act, will make a significant contribution 
to the ability of law enforcement to fight terrorism in this country and 
abroad More specifically. Bill C-36 will criminalize terrorist financing, 
establish a procedure to freeze, seize and forfeit proceeds for and 
proceeds of terrorist activities or groups. It will enhance our ability to 
protect sensitive information. It will create new investigative tools and 
allow for preventative arrests when needed to address the serious 
threats posed by terrorists groups and those who would carry out
Hansard, October 16"  ^2001, p. 6204.
^  Hansard, House of Commons debates, Vol 137. Number 119.1^' session, Parliament. 
November 27, 2001, p. 7533.
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terrorist activities. It will establish a means to identify and list terrorist 
groups®^
The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police; the Canadian Police 
Association; the National Association of Professional Police also strongly 
supported the Bill and its new powers.®'  ^Gwen Boniface, President of the 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, took the opportunity to ask for 
amendments to the Bill that would grant even more powers to police.®® 
Constable Grant Obst, president of the Canadian Police Association, stated 
that his organization strongly supported the Bill and urged the Parliament to 
proceed with swift passage. In addition he also took the opportunity to ask for 
additional funds to fulfill the new role of fighting terrorism.®®
The main concern of these groups was that, after debate, a “sunset 
clause” might be added to the legislation. The group felt that a review would 
be prudent and useful but a sunset clause did not make sense. They argued 
that terrorism existed before September11th and would exist after any sort of 
sunset clause timeline.®^ The second most prevalent criticism was not so 
much directed at the Bill but at Parliament and the need for more funds to hire 
and train more officers.®®
Of those that presented to the committee the vast majority fell into the 
category of organizations or individuals that had serious reservations about
standing Committee, October 23'^ '' 2001.63
^  Standing Committee, November 1®’ 2001 
^  Standing Committee, November 1®' 2001 
Standing Committee, November 1®' 2001
Standing Committee, November 1®’ 2001, see comments by Constable Grant Obst and Mr. 
Leo Knight
^  Standing Committee, November 1®* 2001, see Mr. Mike Neibudek’s answers to questions 
from Ms. Pierrette Venne
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the Bill. Most of their criticism centered on the definition of terrorism 
contained in the first draft of Bill C-36. Section 83.01 b ii (E) of the first draft 
of the Bill states that “to cause serious interference with or serious disruption 
of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than 
as a result of lawful advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that does 
not involve an activity that is intended to result in the conduct or harm referred 
to in any of clauses (A) to (0).”®^ The main problem with the definition is the 
use of the word lawful, which implies that if a protest or strike is not lawful it 
could be considered a terrorist act. The argument made by Professor Errol 
Menedes, as well as others, illustrate that many times protests, strikes or 
other types of civil disobedience are not legal or lawful but do not rise to the 
level of a terrorist act.^°
Some groups echoed the concerns of the Members of Parliament and 
felt that there should be an outright “sunset clause” for all or part of the 
legislation.^^ Most felt that there should be a review of some kind at either 
three years or annually. Errol Mendes suggested that if there was a yearly 
review then it would be possible to make sure that sections like the
Bill C-36, first reading, October 15, 2001, House of Commons Canada. Bill C -36.1®* 
session, 37 Pariiament, 49-50 Elizabetfi II, 2001 (Ottawa:Public Works and Government 
Services Publishing, 2001)
Standing Committee evidence, November s"’ 2001, October 24'*’ 2001 comments by 
Patrick Monahan; see also Irwin Cotier. “Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles 
for a Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy”. The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti- 
Terrorism Bin. Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach eds. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), p. 123.
Standing Committee, November 6"’ 2001, see comments by Michael Bossin, President of 
Amnesty International (Canada) English section.; Comments by Bryan Schwartz.
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preventative arrest section and the investigative hearing sections were 
working within the confines of the Charter
Heading the group of organizations that did not support the Bill at all in 
its first draft was the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Alan Borovoy 
stated in his presentation before the Committee “the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association believes this bill is too broad. It is capable of targeting a variety 
of behaviour that bears no resemblance to the kind of behaviour most of us 
would call t e r r o r i s m . J o h n  Russell of the British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association was slightly less critical of the Bill but raised the point that a sort 
of racial profiling could occur that would result in people of Muslim descent 
being targeted for scrutiny or arrest. '^^ The Canadian Arab Federation also 
felt that the Bill was poorly written and moreover, redundant. They argued 
that there were other parts of Canadian law to cover terrorist offences and 
that the Committee was rushing into creation of a new Bill without giving the 
House and the Government enough time to deal with, or even conceive of. 
Bill C-36's potential consequences.^^
Professor Mohamed Elmasry , National President of the Canadian 
Islamic Congress, is quoted as saying.
Mr. Chair, you're going to hear supporters of this bill saying it's a good 
bill, but I submit to you that it's a bad bill. Muslim Canadians—Arab 
Canadians and those who are similar in appearance or by name to
Ibid, November 6*^  2001, Comments by Errol Mendes. 
Ibid, October 24*^ 2001.
Standing Committee, October 30'^ 2001.
Standing Committee, November 6"^  2001.
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those known to be Muslim and Arabs—will be the most targeted group 
in this country, and we should not allow this to happen.
Rocco Galati, the Canadian Islamic Congress’s legal counsel, went even 
farther:
This bill is, in my humble submission, obscene in the net it casts. You 
might as well have deleted the constitution from our landscape. The bill 
is so overbroad, it catches socio-economic and political offences. It 
creates them: strikes, work stoppages, boycotts, protests, association, 
assembly, and free speech.
What's insidious about this bill, if you read clause 27 and the definition 
of what is a prejudicial act to the safety or interest of the state, is that 
there are various economic crimes that relate back to the definition of 
terrorism that would catch boycotts for environmental and ethical 
reasons; would catch any legal strike against the financial markets.
This is as much about stomping anti-globalization, anti-poverty, anti­
logging protest as it is about terrorism. In fact, if it were just about 
terrorism, this bill would be ten to fifteen pages long [rather than 187 
pages].
You are invoking extraordinary measures we haven't seen since June 
21,1941, and October 1970 in terms of secret trials, secret trial 
mechanisms, the abrogation of the right to remain silent, self­
incrimination, the 72-hour detention without charge. You have 
investigative hearings that do away with all charter rights, and then you 
have seizure of property, and then the power to charge, convict, and 
sentence someone—even without knowledge whether he's a 
facilitator—with secret trials.
I'm probably the only one in the room who's actually conducted these 
secret trials under the Immigration Act. They are the substance of a 
dictatorship, of a police state. You don't get to see the evidence, ever. 
It's all dealt with by the judge. It's covered; the accused person never 
gets to see it.
The concerns of both sides of the debate were valid, but the above quote by 
Mr. Galati illustrates the main point of this thesis. There are portions of the 
Bill that are clearly incompatible with the Charter and with the basic tenets of
Standing Committee, November 6'^ 2001. 
Standing Committee, November 6*^  2001.
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due process. These concerns were clearly raised during the creation and 
amending of the Bill and were, for the most part, ignored. While there were 
some substantial amendments recommended by the Committee, the general 
tone and tenor of the Bill remains the same and Mr. Galati’s concerns were 
largely ignored.
Amendments:
The various submissions and criticisms resulted in a handful of 
substantive amendments to the Bill. On November 20, 2001, the Government 
of Canada tabled these amendments before the Justice and Human Rights 
Committee.
Provisions in Bill C-36 dealing with preventive arrest and 
Investigative hearing powers would sunset after five years unless 
a resolution was passed by both the House of Commons and Senate 
to extend either or both of these powers for up to five more years. A 
provision would also be added to grandfather proceedings that have 
already started prior to the sunset date so that they could be 
completed, if the powers are not extended.
The Attorney General and Solicitor General of Canada, provincial 
Attorneys General and Ministers responsible for policing would be 
required to report annually to Pariiament on the use of the 
preventive arrest and investigative hearing provisions in Bill C-36.
Provisions dealing with Attorney General certificates would be 
amended so that the certificate could no longer be issued at any 
time, but only after an order or decision for disclosure has been made 
in a proceeding. The life of the certificate would be fifteen years, 
unless re-issued. The certificate would be published in the Canada 
Gazette. The Attorney General certificate would be subject to review 
by a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal. The existing provisions 
and process for the collection, use, and protection of information would 
be preserved under the Privacy Act and the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act.
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The word "lawful" would be deleted from the definition of terrorist 
activity. This will ensure that protest activity, whether lawful or 
unlawful, would not be considered a terrorist act unless it was 
intended to cause death, serious bodily harm, endangerment of life or 
serious risk to the health or safety of the public.
An interpretive clause would be added to the Bill clarifying that the 
expression of political, religious or ideological beliefs is not a terrorist 
activity unless it also constitutes conduct that meets the definition of 
"terrorist activity."
The provisions concerning facilitation of a terrorist activity would be 
reordered so that they clearly state that, in order to be guilty of an 
offence, an individual must know or intend that his or her act would 
help a terrorist activity to occur, even if the details of the activity are not 
known by the individual.
The result is that many of the main sticking points of the Bill that were 
explored in Committee proceedings were dealt with in some manner. 
However, several of the most constitutionally offensive portions of the Bill, 
such as those portions highlighted by Rocco Galati, like preventative arrest 
and secret investigative hearings, still remain.
The amended legislation was debated for a mere 5 hours after it was 
reported by Committee and the Government took the unusual step of invoking 
closure of debate in order to pass the legislation quickly.^® Anne McLellan 
defended the measure by saying “[t]he purpose of time allocation is to ensure 
that the government discharges its obligation in relation to the safety and 
security of Canadians. There has been much debate. It is now time for
Standing Committee, November 20 2001. 
Hansard, November 27*'  ^2001, p. 7532.
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action.”®° Of course, fast law does not necessarily mean bad law but there 
was considerable concern expressed by Members of Parliament that a Bill of 
this breadth and depth, which could fundamentally alter the sanctity of 
Charter rights was not given the due diligence and debate that such 
legislation should command. Limiting the debate meant that the moral 
question, “should we be enacting this legislation?” was replaced with the 
question, “how should we enact this legislation.”
Summary:
Bill 0-36 received Royal Assent on December 18, 2001. The purpose 
of this chapter was to present the issues and concerns raised by various 
groups and to draw a line from the time of the Bill’s inception and creation to 
the date of Royal Assent. Temporally that timeline was remarkably short, just 
over three months from the “problem” event, until the Bill became an Act. 
Kingdon’s model served as the framework for the policy analysis that allowed 
for the identification of the forces, organizations and individuals that created 
and shaped the policy as it traveled through the policy window. The policy 
analysis identified the policy entrepreneurs, the basis of political support and 
the rise of the issue of anti-terrorism/counter-terrorism on the governmental 
and decision agendas. Further, through the House of Commons debates and 
the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights proceedings, the 
various actors involved in policy making who were not the entrepreneurs but 
played an important role nonetheless were identified.
Hansard, November 27*^ 2001, p. 7536.
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Conclusions
The Canadian government created and passed Bill 0-36 in haste, as a 
response to pressure from the United States to tighten Canadian security and 
in its haste, did not deal adequately with some components of the Bill that 
may, later, be deemed unconstitutional. Perhaps a longer time frame 
punctuated with more open and honest debate where the question of “should 
we enact this legislation?” would have created an effective and, more 
importantly, constitutional solution to the problem of losing the confidence of 
the United States.
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Chapter Two 
Potential problems with Bill C-36
Bill C-36 amends the Criminal Code, herein referred to as the Code, in 
numerous ways. First, the bill defines what constitutes terrorist activity.®^ The 
main criticism is that the definition is much too broad. Section 83.01 (1) E of 
the Act was originally amended to remove the word “lawful” from the 
definition, as it would tend to make any sort of disruptive but legitimate protest 
or strike a terrorist of fence.However ,  even with this amendment the 
definition may still be too broad. This is true because the Bill does not 
explicitly list what types of offences are, or are not, terrorist offences it will be 
law enforcement entities that will create the definition, which will either be 
accepted or discounted by the Courts.
Second, the bill defines what is to take place if a terrorist offence has 
or is about to be committed. This includes preventative arrest and 
investigative hearings that compel people who appear to provide evidence 
even though they are not under arrest. If they do not testify or turn over 
materials that are required by the Court then there is the possibility of arrest. 
Section 83.28 (8) of the code compels people appearing before a judge to
Government of Canada, “The Anti-Terrorism Act,” Statutes of Canada, Volume III,(Ottawa: 
Queens Printer, 2001) 0-41
^  Irwin Cotier. “Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism 
Law and Policy”. The Security of Freedom:Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Biii. Ronald 
Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 
p. 122. See also Amendments to Bill C-36 Online @
http://canada.iustice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001 /doc 27902.html accessed July 26, 2003.
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answer questions or supply information and materials. Section 83.28 (10) 
expressly prohibits people appearing before a judge to exercise their right to 
not incriminate themselves.®^ This is a clear violation of section 13, the right 
to refuse to provide self-incriminating evidence, of the Charter and the court 
has ruled on numerous occasions that a person has the right to refuse to 
provide information that would be self-incriminating.®'* Section 83.29 allows 
for issuance of an arrest warrant for people who do not appear to answer 
questions or produce information.®® It is important to note that while a person 
appearing is not under arrest, per se, they are not able to leave the 
proceedings until the judge says they can go. If they do leave or do not 
appear in the first place they can be arrested. In R y. Therens the court 
defined detention as a deprivation of liberty by physical constraint or 
psychological compulsion or coercion where the police or other agent of the 
State assumes control over the movements of a person by demand or 
direction.®® Section 9 of the Charter states that everyone has the right not to 
be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.®^ If person involved in an investigative 
hearing is not under arrest but cannot leave or not attend then they are 
detained under the court’s definition of detention. They are both physically
^  Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 32.
In British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch (1995) 2 S.C.R. 3, the court ruled 
that if the purpose of the investigative hearing was to gather evidence against the person 
called rather than some legitimate public purpose then the right to avoid seif-incrimination 
was intact, if a person is compelled to testify or give information that does incriminate them 
they are immune from prosecution using their statements in any sort of subsequent trial 
proceedings. See also Canada(Attorney Generai)v. Canada(Commissioner of the Inquiry on 
the Blood System) (1997) 3 S.C.R. 440, and R v. lyiannion, (1986) 2 S.C.R. 272
Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 35.
R V. Therens, (1985) 1 S.C.R. 613
Constitution Act, 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, The Constitution 
Acts 1867 to 1982 (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1989), p. 60.
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and, more importantly, psychologically compelled to participate in the hearing 
since failure to do so will result in a warrant for their arrest. The issue will 
hinge on whether this consitutes arbitrary detention. Arbitrariness has been 
interpreted by the courts to mean “capricious, despotic or unjustifiable.”®® It is 
possible that the detention contained within s 83.28 and 83.29 could be 
justifiable in the interest public safety but that does not preclude that it may be 
capricious or despotic.
Preventative arrest is another troublesome part of the code that has 
resulted from the creation of Bill C-36. Section 83.30 (4) allows a peace 
officer to arrest any person that he/she feels has or is going to commit a 
terrorist offence.®® On its face, that is not unreasonable. Police officers 
detain and arrest people all the time based on probable cause. Probable 
cause is the belief that a crime has been committed; is being committed; or its 
commission is imminent.®® Yet in the case of Bill C-36, a police officer only 
need believe that a crime might be committed in the future, not necessarily 
that it is imminent. The courts have ruled in the past that a person cannot be 
arrested or detained without probable cause to believe that an offence has or 
will be committed.®^ This sort of arrest and detention also seems to be in 
violation of section 9 of the Charter, which guarantees against arbitrary 
detention, because the reason for the detention may be considered arbitrary. 
For example, it is possible that a person may be detained simply because
R V. Sieben (1989), 73 C.R (3d) 31. See also R  v. Madsen (1994), 67 W .A.C 259  
Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 36.
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S, c. C-34, s. 1, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1985), s. 495 (1) 
R V. Duguay, Murphy and Sevigny (1989) 1 S.C.R 93, see also R v. Young (1997),138  
F.T.R 37(1998)
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they belong to a particular ethnic or religious group whose physical and 
cultural characteristics are similar to those of members of know terrorist 
organizations. This could also be construed as a violation of s. 15(1) equality 
rights and s. 2 rights of association, assembly, religion and belief.
When a person is arrested in this manner section 83.30(6) requires 
that they be brought before a judge within 24 hours unless a judge is not 
available. If a judge is not available then the accused must be brought before 
a judge as soon as possible.®^ Bear in mind that at this point a suspect has 
not been charged yet, only detained. This too is not unreasonable since it is 
also a common occurrence in normal procedure of arrest and indictment. 
However, what is not common is that a judge may adjourn for up 48 additional 
hours in order to consider evidence of the legality of the detention.®^ This 
means that a person could be detained for up to 72 hours without being 
charged with an offence. Further, the judge may decide that the detention is 
not lawful and release the detained individual; but impose conditions on the 
released person at the judge’s discretion. This is problematic in light of the 
Charter and section 10 (c), which guarantees due process and habeas 
corpus. Section 10 (c) states that: “Everyone has the right on arrest or 
detention to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas 
corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.”®"^ The court has ruled 
that a period of approximately 20 hours but no more than 24 hours is
^  Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 37 
^  Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 38, s. 83.30(7). 
Constitution Act, 1982, p. 60
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sufficient to produce the body of a case and lay a charge or affect a release.^^ 
Further, section 503(1) of the Criminal Code also affirms the 24 hour time limit 
to bring an arrested person before a justice to determine if the detention is 
lawful.^® This is similar to what is included in section 83.30(6) of Bill C-36 
including the provision for a delay if there is no justice available. However, 
there was previously no provision in the Code for a judge to take an additional 
48 hrs to decide if the detention is lawful. This is a novel power contained in 
Bill 0-36, and, as the court has ruled on what sort of timeline is acceptable, 
this power is inconsistent with s. 10 (c) of the Charter and established case 
law.
Bill C-36 also amends the Official Secrets Act in a number of ways.
The main issue here is the ability of the Crown to keep information secret if it 
is deemed in the public interest to do so. Section 15 of the Official Secrets 
Act, herein known as the OSA, allows for information to be kept secret if there 
is a specified public interest.®^ The judge in the case would be allowed to see 
information but it would not be made public. In the case of an investigative 
hearing such information may not even be available to a detained individual 
or their legal counsel.
The amendments to the Canada Evidence Act include another 
provision for excluding information if it is in the public interest. Section 37 (1) 
of the act allows for an objection by the government to disclosure of 
information on the grounds that it is in the specified public interest to keep it
R V. Sullivan (1991), 96 Nfld. & P .E .I.R ., 305 A.P.R. 7
Criminal Code of Canada,. R.S., c. C-34, s. 1, (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1985), s. 503.1 
Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 66.
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confidential.®® Section 38.06 (1 -3) allows for tfie judge to dictate what sort of 
disclosure there will be. The judge may rule on the merits of full, partial or 
non- disclosure if the disclosure would be injurious to the public interest.®® 
Also when making a determination in a hearing the court may receive into 
evidence anything that is reliable and appropriate even if it would not normally 
be admissible under Canadian law.^°° The lack of disclosure and the 
inclusion of discretionary evidence that would not normally be admitted is 
problematic when measured against an accused person’s right to mount a 
proper defense. Section 38.14(1) is designed to protect the right of a fair trial. 
As long as that protection does not violate section 38.06 mentioned above.
In other words, the right to fair trial can be compromised by failure to disclose 
relevant information if it is deemed that its release would harm the public 
interest.
There are several problems that are exposed in the Bill’s 
amendments to the Evidence Act. First, the court has ruled that in order for a 
person to know if they are in enough jeopardy to exercise their right to retain 
legal counsel their s. 10 (a) rights have to be respected. Section 10 (a) of the 
Charter states that: “Everyone has the right on arrest or detention to be 
informed of the reasons thereof.” ®^® This means that they need to be told why 
they have been detained for the investigative hearing. Theoretically, this also 
means that they should be apprised of any evidence against them and from
Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 78. 
Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 88. 
Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 79. 
Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 94. 
Constitution Act, 1982, p. 60.
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this they can then decide if they wish to retain counsel. At first blush Bill C- 
36 seems to respect the spirit of s. 10(a). Section 83.28(11) of the Anti- 
Terrorism Act allows for a person to retain counsel at any time during the 
proceedings.However ,  since it is possible that the information needed to 
make the determination of jeopardy may not have been disclosed it is also 
possible that the person involved in the hearing may not be aware that they 
need counsel. The court has ruled that simply telling someone they can have 
counsel but not telling them enough to decide if they need counsel does not 
satisfy the crown’s obligation under s. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter.^^^
The second problem with the amendments to the Evidence Act is that 
disclosure has the potential to be severely limited. In most cases, the person 
involved, as a “witness” in an investigative hearing will not have been 
charged. However, that does not mean that full or partial disclosure should 
not apply, regardless of the admissibility of the evidence. The protection of 
adequate disclosure is designed to prevent the Crown from hiding potentially 
exculpatory information. This would also be the case in an actual trial under 
the provisions of Bill C-36 and then the previous court rulings on disclosure 
would certainly apply. The fact that this evidence can be kept secret based on 
public interest is contrary to what the court has ruled in the past. In cases like 
R. V. Dersch and R. v. Stinchcombe the court has ruled that disclosure of 
evidence is required regardless of whether that evidence is inculpatory or 
exculpatory. The only exception is if the judge finds that the evidence does
Anti-Terrorism Act, p. 37.
R. V. Evans (1991) 1 S.C.R. 869, see also R. u.O’Donne//(1991) 296 A.P.R.( N.B.C.A) 91
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not need to be disclosed in order for a person to make a full answer and 
defense under s. 7 of the Charter.^®® The need to balance the public interest 
with the interests of the accused is ongoing but Bill C-36 has made it even 
more imperative. The release of documents and information during a trial or 
a hearing may jeopardize intelligence personnel or may tip off terrorist 
organizations that they are being targeted. That said, it is also very important 
to protect an individual’s right to a fair trial and their right to make a full 
answer defence. The Court is in the position of having to balance these two 
very important considerations.
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate the flaws in the Bill that 
may be considered in a Charter challenge. Further, this chapter also 
presented examples of precedent or institutional history that support the claim 
that each of the highlighted sections could be considered incompatible with 
the Charter. The principles that would be argued in a case involving the Anti- 
Terrorism Act, 2001 are encompassed in many past decisions by the 
Supreme Court of Canada and many lower courts. The court has been clear 
on such things as evidence disclosure, warrant less arrest, due process and 
immunity from self-incrimination. This suggests that a case involving any one 
of these legal rights would have a large number of precedents militating a 
court or judge to find the offending portions of the legislation unconstitutional. 
Further, it also means that this finding of unconstitutionality would not be 
saved by section 1 of the Charter.
R. V. Dersch, (1990) 2 S.C.R 1505; R. v. Stinchcombe, (1991) 3 S.C.R 326 see also R. v. 
O ’Connor, (1995) 4 S.C.R. 411
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However, the business of judicial decision-making is fraught with 
difficulties. Chief among them is the balance that must be maintained 
between freedom and security. The context of the case, the timing of the 
challenge and other things may make a difference as to what the judge in 
question may decide is more important, freedom or security.
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Chapter Three 
Ronald Dworkln’s Theory of Judicial Decisions
Ronald Dworkin Is a respected judicial theorist and this thesis employs 
his theory of judicial decision-making, as it is salient to the argument. 
Dworkin’s theory supposes that judges employ some sort of rational criteria to 
their judicial decisions. Dworkin presupposes two things, one is that since 
there is an element of rationality to the decisions judges make, patterns can 
be identified and studied to ascertain what will be decided in future cases, 
either by another judge in a similar case or by the same judge; two, this 
theory gives us a criteria with which to categorize judges based on their past 
decisions. There are other theories that explain the judicial decision-making 
process from a variety of standpoints. These theories, and some of their 
proponents, will be presented at the end of this chapter.
Policy V. Principle
Arguably, the traditional view of judicial decision-making is that a 
judge’s decision should be as unoriginal as possible and simply uphold 
legislature as passed and not make new law to cover what elected officials 
had not envisioned, or purposely left out, when the legislation in question was 
en ac te d .D wor k in  suggests that the traditional view of how a judge comes 
to an original decision in a hard case is not at all accurate. He writes, “judges
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Serious/y (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1978), p.
84.
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do not decide hard cases in two stages, first checking to see where the 
institutional constraints end, and then setting the books aside to stride off on 
their own.” °^^  Dworkin theorizes that there are two types of cases, which are 
based either on policy or principle. A case based on principle is one that 
justifies a political decision that secures some type individual or group right.
A case that is based on policy justifies a political decision that furthers some 
sort of collective goal.^°® For example, an argument of policy might be that 
protection from terrorism is a political decision that secures the collective goal 
of security and safety. On the other hand, an argument of principle on the 
same issue may be that increased safety is not worth diminishing individual or 
group rights. Dworkin suggests that most cases that are based on rights are, 
by their nature, cases of principle. In the context of Canada, a case could be 
made that the enumerated equality rights contained in section 15 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms are incomplete and some other right, like 
sexual orientation, should be included because the principle behind the right 
is the same as the enumerated rights already included. That argument that 
the principle of equality has been made in the past and as a result of an 
original judicial decision the right now enjoys the same protection as surely as 
if it was written in the Charter.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriousiy, p. 66. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 82. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 82.
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Types of Rights
According to Dworkin there are several types of rights that bear on the 
judicial decision-making process. They are abstract rights, background rights, 
concrete rights and institutional rights.
Abstract rights
Abstract rights are rights that are held by each person in society and 
justify political decisions by so c ie t y . ^An  example would be the right to 
liberty. It is an abstract concept that while not spelled out it is important to all 
members of society. People would not want a political or judicial entity acting 
in a manner that was inconsistent with society’s view of liberty. They would 
not want people to be detained and lose their liberty without some sort of 
reason. So in that vein the government and courts would have to act in a 
manner that would preserve liberty, everyday. The particular way in which 
governments preserve that liberty is unimportant when discussing abstract 
rights, it is enough that it is broadly recognized as a right that society holds as 
important. Background rights are an example of an abstract right. They exist 
in the background of everyday life. They exist but they contain no form or 
function except in the mind of each individual.
Concrete rights
Concrete rights are an example of an abstract right that has been 
given some form and function such as legal rights that have been spelled out.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriousiy, p. 93.
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Institutional rights are examples of a concrete right that has been affirmed to 
be important by the institutions, like legislatures, and are protected by some 
sort of defining. They are rights that have been entrenched in some sort of 
political action or legislation.^”  An example of that sort of right would be the 
Charter requirement, under s. 10(b), that upon arrest or detention you be 
allowed to contact a lawyer as soon as possible.”  ^ This is right that is 
concrete because it is entrenched in legislation as well as convention. This 
right cannot be limited and is, barring impossibility, absolute.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
In the Canadian context, the Charter not only lists what sort of rights 
Canadians possess but also what sort of freedoms they enjoy. The 
fundamental difference between a right and a freedom is that a right is a 
positive protection of a freedom by a concrete legislative response that 
defines that right at the same time as protecting it. A freedom, on the other 
hand, also enjoys a measure of legislative protection but is not limited or 
defined by the legislation that protects it. In this sense a charter freedom is 
more like Dworkin’s conception of a background or abstract right and a 
charter right is more like a concrete or institutional right. Even though a 
freedom may owe its codification to a legislative response, the response does 
not define it or limit it and therefore it remains an abstract notion of a freedom. 
All of this is not to say that concrete rights affirming or defining freedoms does 
not exist, it does. An example would be freedom of the press, which is
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriousiy, p. 93. 
Constitution Act, 1982, p. 60.
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contained in section 2 (b) of the Charter.^^^ This freedom is tempered by 
legislation and case law that defines what freedom of the press means in 
practice. For example, sections 110(1) and 111 (1) of the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act (YCJA) expressly prohibits the publication of the identities of any 
person charged or acts as witness under the Act if they are under the age of 
18 and are not being tried as an adult.^ "^  ^ In this case, freedom of the press is 
limited by the young person’s concrete right to privacy as it is recognized by 
the YCJA. In a certain sense, freedoms are absolute if there is no legislation 
created to limit or define how far a freedom can be enjoyed.
Dworkin suggests that all rights could, but need not always be, 
abso lute.^For  example an abstract right (or a freedom) is absolute but the 
conception of what that right means in practice is tempered by the legislative 
and judicial bodies ability to recognize and protect it. A concrete right is 
absolute in the sense that it not only has “thought” but also has the element of 
“deed” or “existence.” The right is preserved as a law or policy and therefore 
has force. It is also a legal right, by virtue of the legislative and judicial 
consequences that will result in not respecting or complying with it.
Dworkin states that judges decide hard cases by confirming or denying 
concrete r i gh ts .Therefore  it is the concrete rights that are most salient to 
this thesis. Concrete rights are rights that have been entrenched in legislation 
or in an over arching constitution. The Charter rights that are guaranteed in
Constitution Act, 1982, p. 58.
Youth Criminal Justice Act, Acts of the Parliament of Canada, 2002. Vol. 1 c .1 , (Ottawa: 
Queens Printer, 2002), p.1
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriousiy, p. 92.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 101.
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the first 32 sections of the Constitution Act, 1982 are mixture of concrete 
rights and abstract freedoms. Concrete rights cannot be compromised away, 
the way that a community goal can, and they cannot be unfairly limited 
without some sort of justification. This is what the court justices must decide 
when they hear a hard case based on a Charter rights challenge.
Limiting rights is normal in the context of competing rights and the 
justices of the court need to be able to justify the limit on a right that as 
Dworkin states may well be absolute. However, all rights cannot be 
absolute. It is difficult to imagine a world where the right to do whatever one 
wants is paramount. That is tempered only by other people’s right to do 
whatever they want and inevitably would result in a conflict of competing 
rights. The courts recognize this conflict will occur and interprets the concrete 
rights and abstract freedoms contained in the Crtarter with an eye to allowing 
the most freedom possible, without limiting either person’s rights unjustly.
Institutional History
Institutional history is what Dworkin calls the entire body of precedent, 
or cases that have been decided in the past, that exists that upholds or 
denies a certain argument of principle. This body of cases has a gravitational 
force that would drive any cases that come after it towards a certain direction
Section 1 of the Charter allows for the limit of rights If It Is demonstrably justified In a free 
and democratic society. This takes Into account Dworkin’s view that rights, concrete rights, 
compete with other concrete rights as It recognizes that there will be times when rights need 
to be balanced against each other. This could be In the context of Individual versus group 
rights or even Individual versus Individual rights.
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that would necessarily uphold the findings of principle in the case at hand/^® 
This force is pervasive and in a sense prevents a truly novel and original 
decision from being rendered. That said, there are times when the 
gravitational force of precedent is pulling the judge towards what is clearly an 
injustice and that can result in an original decision. The example of sexual 
orientation illustrates the point. Suppose the issue has been consistently 
ignored and defeated in the courts thus setting up a line of precedent that 
perpetrated what, in the fullness of time, has come to be seen as an injustice. 
If a judge does nothing but follow precedent in order to make sure that his/her 
decision is consistent it will most likely result in the same sort of injustice 
being perpetrated in the case at hand. However, if a judge recognizes that 
the precedents, which may have served well in the past, are no longer 
reflective of society, then he/she might step outside precedent and create an 
original decision that would in turn start another line of precedent and a new 
institutional history. However, Dworkin theorizes that judges will want to be 
able to bring their decision within some sort of larger scope or context. He 
calls this articulated consistency and it means that even in an original 
decision a judge looks for precedent that can back up his findings even if, 
perhaps, it is stretching the meaning of the principle appl ied.^There is 
always a point of departure, sometimes it is a fracture and sometimes it is an 
incremental change that requires the government and the courts to respond 
to society’s changing visions and conceptions of abstract or background
118
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rights. The difference is largely dependant on the type of judge(s) that 
hear(s) the case at hand.
Hercules vs. Herbert
Dworkin creates two categories of judges to assist in explaining his 
theory. One he calls Hercules and the other he calls Herbert. Their 
approaches to decision making are markedly different.
Hercules is the name that Dworkin gives to a judge who is able gauge 
what the spirit of the statute is, what the meaning of the precedents, or 
institutional history, of the previous decisions of principle is and what the 
community morality is on the issue at hand. This supposes that Hercules 
would know the mind of the legislators and what policy or statute, if they were 
presented with the case at hand, they would enact.
Herbert is the name that Dworkin gives to the type of judge who is not 
all knowing and who generally speaking would defer to precedent or the 
legislature on most issues. Herbert does not know or presume to be able to 
discover what was in the mind of legislators who created the statute at hand.
If the case is a simple matter that asks him to apply a set of rules then 
Herbert will do just that and will not try to go any further in his analysis. 
However, in a hard case he/she must decide that the principle being argued is 
actually valid and that there is someone who deserves to “win” the case. 
Herbert’s version of an original decision does not take into account 
community morality as he/she supposes that it is included in the precedents
59
or institutional history/^° He/she feels that one does not need to choose 
between history, past cases, and morality, as they are one in the same. The 
morality of society is included in the institutional history.^^^ Herbert will want to 
use the gravitational force to illustrate that his/her original decision is well 
supported by precedent and well accepted as moral based on institutional 
history. In that sense it may not be a truly original decision at all, but merely a 
reflection gravitational force.
Hercules, on the other hand, will want to limit or even deny that force if 
he/she feels that he cannot consistently appeal to that force in the case at 
hand or in the f u t u r e . T h i s  is the primary difference between Herbert and 
Hercules. Both may come to the conclusion that someone has a right to win 
the case and that while there is no allowance for the particular situation in the 
statute in question an argument of principle could convince them to make an 
original decision. Herbert may have some reservations but if he/she did 
agree to these premises he/she would write his/her decision based on the 
institutional history and precedent at hand. Hercules would write his/her 
decision based on his conception of fairness and morality while still trying to 
be true to the doctrine of articulated consistency while limiting the 
gravitational force of precedent.
Herbert sees himself/herself as a mirror of the legislature and the case 
law contained in the precedents or institutional history. In Hebert’s mind the 
citizens of society would look at him/her and the legislature and see a more or
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriousiy, pp. 125-126. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriousiy, p. 87. 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriousiy, pp.121, 113.
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less seamless wall with the only seam being where arguments of policy end 
and arguments of principle begin.
Hercules also sees himself/hersellf as a mirror of the citizens that 
make up society. His/her perception is that community morality and 
community values are not necessarily contained in legislation or even in the 
mind of the legislator who is supposed to represent the citizen. In his/her 
mind, community morality and community values are contained in his/her 
decisions.
Judicial Criteria
So what then are the criteria that we can use to decide if the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada is a Herbert or a Hercules? If a 
justice, is, to a certain extent, deferent to the legislature, relies on precedent 
to preserve articulated consistency and is not concerned with expressions of 
community morality in their decisions, outside what is contained in the 
precedent employed, then they can be categorized as a Herbert type judge.
A Hercules type judge would not be deferent to the legislature since 
he/she presumes to know what the legislators would do to solve the case at 
hand. He/she would also not be inclined to use the gravitational force of 
precedent to remain true to the doctrine of articulated consistency. Finally, 
he/she would make certain that his decision included and upheld an 
expression of community morality since he/she does not feel that morality is 
necessarily contained in past precedents and existing legislation.
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Some Critiques of Dworkin’s Theory
There are, of course, other theories that explain how judicial decisions 
are made. Some of them and their proponents are presented below.
Realists
Realist theory centers on the idea that there are no discernable 
patterns in case law judicial decisions. Judges simply muddle through and 
make decisions that are indicative of their experiences and personal 
b i a s e s . R o b e r t  W. Gordon is from the “realist” arm of the movement known 
as Critical Legal Theory and he suggests that there is no pattern to judicial 
decision-making. He argues that even if you could see patterns in 
institutional history they do not govern the actions of justices as much as 
Dworkin su g g e s t s . Je r o m e  Frank, another realist, who calls the idea of 
following institutional history an exercise in finding “Illusory Precedents”, 
echoes this.^^^ What Frank means is that there are precedents contained in 
institutional history but they are not in a discernable pattern and, individually, 
they could be used to support almost any position.
Legal Positivism
Legal positivist theory, which is closer than the realist school of thought 
to Dworkin’s conception of how judicial decisions are made, is, nonetheless, 
also at odds with some of his assertions. Legal positivists assume that there
Jerome Frank, “Realism and the Law”, Readings in the Phiiosophy of Law, 3’'* ed, Eds 
John Arthur and William H. Shaw (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 2001), p. 133-140.
Robert W . Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories”, Criticai Legai Studies, Ed. James Boyle (New  
York: New York University Press, 1992), p. 57-161.
Frank, Realism and the Law, p. 136-137.
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is a gulf between the way that the law is and the way that the law ought to be. 
That is, they believe that there is some point where law, as it is, and morality, 
as it ought to be, intersect.^^® W. L. Waluchow, a legal positivist, argues that 
Dworkin’s suggestion that morality, which is contained in the institutional 
history, creates the best example of a settled conception of law is, at best, a 
haphazard representation of morality and its effect on decision making. 
Instead, Waluchow states that judges will make decisions based on their 
understanding of community morality even if there is some measure of 
community morality contained in institutional history.
Waluchow also argues that Dworkin’s theory does not sufficiently take 
into account the effect that some institutional forces of law, like the make-up 
and hierarchy of the court system, can limit the power of lower court judges, 
even Herculean judges.^^® What he means is that Hercules may not be able 
to deny the gravitational force of precedent because it is simply not in his 
power to ignore it. This true because, precedent, even mistaken precedent, 
still has force and, middle and lower court judges may not be able to ignore its 
gravitational force even if the judge in question is a lower court Hercules.
While the criticisms of both schools of thought suggest that Dworkin 
has, to some extent, simplified the process that judges go through when they 
make decisions they do not render his theory impotent for the purposes of this
H.L.A Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, Readings in the126 n.i_ rv ridi i ruo
Phiiosophy of Law, 3’'* ed, Eds John Arthur and William H. Shaw (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 
Inc, 2001), p. 151.
W.L. Waluchow, Inciusive Legal Positivism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 
43-45.
Waluchow, Inciusive Legai Positivism, pp. 53-55.
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thesis. Dworkin’s theory is useful in this case because his theory 
presupposes that institutional history or precedent is like a road map that can 
be read to determine where arguments on specific issues have come from 
and where they are going. In the context of Canadian jurisprudence on 
Charter rights the timeline is only twenty years and in that time the Courts in 
Canada have created a roadmap, with a few detours, that can be followed. In 
contrast, the American Courts have had much longer to take detours and 
create bypasses as the justices have attempted to define and protect rights 
that are enshrined in the American Bill of Rights. The theorists that are 
critical of Dworkin’s approach dismissing his theory by declaring it too 
simplistic and Dworkin guilty of assuming order and patterns where they do 
not exist are measuring the validity of the theory in relation to 200 odd years 
of jurisprudence, in the American context. In that case, the criticisms may be 
valid. But in the Canadian context the passage of time has not yet made it 
impossible to see the road map that is made up of case law and precedent. 
Dworkin’s abstract theory is affirmed by this reality of Canadian judicial 
decision-making, which is why Dworkin’s theory, rather than some other, is 
the most salient to this Canadian example of Bill C-36.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to examine Dworkin’s theory of 
judicial decision making to ascertain what criteria may be used to label a 
judge as either Hercules or Herbert. With that criterion in mind the thesis will
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examine what sort of justice Beverly McLachiln Is and what effect, If any, this 
could have over the rest of the justices who sit on the Supreme Court of 
Canada.
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Chapter Four 
Dworkin’s theory applied to the Canadian Supreme Court
The Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, herein referred 
to as the SCC, are not like Dworkin’s Hercules. In reality, few judges, if any 
are able to know and balance all that Hercules does when he decides a hard 
case. That is not to say that original decisions are not written, they are. It 
simply means that judges do what they can to understand the principle being 
argued and in some way come to a decision that, as Dworkin says, either 
upholds or denies a concrete right.^^® For the purposes of this thesis the test 
case will be Madam Chief Justice Beverly McLaughlin. Theoretically 
Dworkin’s criterion could be applied to any justice on the Supreme Court, or 
any lower court for that matter. Having said that, it may be problematic to 
analyze the decision-making patterns of other justices especially if their 
background is not in constitutional law or their career experience does not 
span a long period of time. The analysis of their decisions may not yield a 
conclusive picture as to what type of justice they may be. Further, to study all 
of the Justices of the Supreme Court is not feasible and, at best, would only 
yield an incomplete picture of individual justices’ decision-making patterns for 
the reasons just mentioned.
In order to examine decision-making patterns of Chief Justice 
McLachlin the author will employ some of the opinions of Peter McCormick. 
Dr. McCormick is one of, if not the, foremost expert in the area of Canada’s 
Supreme Court and judging and jurisprudence in general. He has researched
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriousiy,pAOl
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and written extensively on the decision-making patterns of the various
incarnations of the Supreme Court of Canada, most extensively in his book
Supreme at Last. Due to this breadth and depth of academic research,
McCormick’s observations about the type of court the “McLachlin Court” is/will
be, are imperative in any discussion of judicial decision-making.
The reasons for using McLaughlin CJ as the test case for Dworkin’s
theory are varied. McLaughlin has been a Justice of the Supreme Court
since 1989 and prior to that she was Chief Justice of the British Columbia
Supreme Court, so her personal experience is both long and steeped in
Charter jurisprudence.
As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, McLaughlin has
the power to set the tone for the court. Some of this power is indicative of her
position, some is indicative of the current make-up of the Court and some is
indicative of her personal ability to manage the other justices and the media.
While it is true that McLachlin’s vote is only one out of nine, there are, at
least, four ways that she can set the tone for the Court.
First, the CJ has several advantages that give her more leverage over
the other members of the court. McCormick writes,
[ajrguably, it always better to be chief justice than not chief justice, 
because the chief justice makes decisions about panel sizes and panel 
assignments, and, when in the majority, she makes the decision about 
who will draft the judgment. Without suggesting that there is anything 
devious about the use of these opportunities and without denying that 
there is a price to pay if that use is too clumsy or too heavy handed, 
these choices can, in aggregate, be highly significant.^^®
130 Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada.
(Toronto; James Lorimer, 2000), p. 163
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As Chris Manfred! argues “I know she is one vote out of nine, but the chief 
justice sets the tone for the court and can have a far greater influence beyond 
that vote” ®^^
Second, by virtue of the fact that there has been a comparatively high
turnover due to retirement in the last three years, the Court is one of the most
junior in history and, according to Peter McCormick, this will mean that
McLachlin will posses more influence over the decisions-making process of
the Court. McCormick writes:
To be sure all judges come to the Court with a considerable degree of 
experience, professionalism, and intelligence, but there is still normally 
a transition period (typically, I would suggest, of two years or more 
before new judges are ‘up to speed’ with their senior colleagues, and 
during that transition period, seniority carries more weight than usual. 
For the first several years of her chief justiceship, McLachlin will be 
presiding over the most junior and inexperienced Courts in its history, 
and this means she will enjoy more leverage from the center chair than 
is normally the case.^®^
Third, she has made herself much more available to the media 
than her predecessors. She has not been afraid to defend the Court’s actions 
in public and she accepts more speaking invitations than former Chief 
Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada Antonio Lamer and Brian 
D i c k s o n . T h i s  results in her being able to control the “spin” on decisions 
even if she did not agree with them. McCormick sums up this power well. He 
writes:
The net effect of all this is to make the chief justice more than ever the 
visible spokesperson for and public access point to the Supreme 
Court. Especially if media availability becomes a regular feature of the
Julian Beitrame, “Judging Beverly” Maclean’s, 20 May 2002, 28 
McCormick, Supreme at Last, pp. 163-164 
Beitrame, “Judging Beverly” Maclean’s,
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McLachiin chief justiceship rather than a one time transitional effect, 
she has an added point of leverage over her colleagues: when the 
Court divides, she will (but they will not) be on the national news for the 
next few days, putting the “spin” on the outcome.
Finally, and perhaps the most salient point, her intellect and ability to
persuade others to reach a consensus on an issue gives her more
opportunity to press the inherent power of her position. This is evident in the
statistics for last year. In 2001, 82% of cases were decided unanimously.
This is the highest it has been in the last ten years and up from 72% in
Lamer’s last year as chief j u s t i c e . T h i s  may be due to the Court being
more junior than Lamer’s in his last year. Regardless, this only serves to
illustrate the point that McLachiin can wield significant influence from the
center chair. That is not say that the other justices of the Supreme Court will
blindly follow her; they will not. However, she is the logical choice as a test
case by virtue of the abilities listed above and the experience she has gained
as a Supreme Court Justice.
Madam Chief Justice Beverly McLachiin is a justice that is more a
Herbert than a Hercules. McLachiin, CJ has always considered the law to be
paramount over personal feelings of an i s s u e . S h e  is quoted as saying “I’m
very much in the middle. I feel strongly about individual liberties, but I also
feel strongly about equality and anti-discrimination provisions in the
Charter.”^^  ^ She is also quoted as saying “I’m not there to vote for this law or
McCormick, Supreme at Last, p. 165
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that. My job is to decide each case fairly, according to the law.”^^ ® She has 
also stated this position in response to criticisms of judicial activism. She 
writes,
Judges must be impartial. They must not be biased. Their job is to 
study the law and the facts, listen to all the arguments pro and con, 
and after due deliberation, rule as their intellect, informed conscience, 
and training dictate. The spectre of agenda-driven judging is, to the 
best of my knowledge, just that -  a spectre. If established, it would be 
a terrible thing and could not be tolerated.
In particular relation to the Charter she writes.
In the course of their work, judges may have developed fairly firm 
views about what a particular Charter provision means or where the 
lines should be drawn between conflicting rights and interests. It is the 
task of the judge, at the beginning of each new case, to suspend those 
views and reconsider them in light of the submissions of the parties in 
that particular case. '^^®
There is also evidence that McLachiin has always identified herself with a
style of judging that is more inclined towards that of a Herbert. In fact, she
has expressed the opinion that a judging style similar to that of a Hercules is
not the most advantageous when dealing with Charter cases. In a 1989
University if British Coiumbia Law Rev/ew article McLachiin, Chief Justice of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, as she was then, writes,
[cjourts must insofar as possible strive for consistency. Judicial 
oscillations may result in decisions which seem more the product of 
particular judges, and perhaps of the particular politicians who 
appointed them, rather than the rule of law. The balance between 
flexibility and consistency is a difficult one, but one which the courts 
must struggle to maintain if their decisions on the Charter are to be
Beitrame. “Judging Beverly” MacLean’s138
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seen as more than the cumulative product of caprice or the political 
process.
With regard to the role of the Courts and the limited deference to the
Legislative and Executive branches of government that is also a characteristic
of a Herbert type judge, McLachiin writes,
The second rule judges should follow is that they should be 
appropriately respectful of the role of Parliament and the legislatures 
and the difficulty of their task. While always important, this rule 
assumes particular significance in cases where the Charter or law at 
issue permits two or more interpretations or authorizes the judge to 
exercise discretion. “Appropriate respect” presupposes an 
understanding of the role of the legislative branch of government as 
the elected representative of the people to enact laws that reflect the 
will and interests of all the people.
To state this role is to acknowledge the difficulty of its execution. In a 
society as diverse and complex as ours, enacting laws is rarely a 
simple process of codifying the will of the people. It is rather a delicate 
task of accommodating conflicting interests and rights. Compromise is 
the watchword of modern governance. Judicial decision-making, on 
the other hand, is necessarily a blunt instrument, incapable of 
achieving the balances necessary for a workable law acceptable to 
society as a whole.
That is not to say that, where an individual’s constitutional rights are at 
stake, the courts must always accept the compromises the legislators 
work out. Where laws unjustifiably violate constitutional rights, it is the 
clear duty of the courts to so declare, with the result that the offending 
law is to that extent null and void under Section 52 of the Charter. 
Slavish deference would reduce Charter rights to meaningless words 
on a scrap of paper. It is to say, however, that judging should be 
grounded in principle and an appropriate respect for the different roles 
of elected representatives of the people and the courts.
Thus far in our Charter’s short history, the courts have repeatedly 
countenanced respect for the choices of Parliament and the 
legislatures. They have repeatedly affirmed that it is not the Court’s 
role to strike the policy compromises that are essential to effective 
modern legislation. The role of the courts is the much more modest 
but nevertheless vital task of hearing constitutional claims brought by 
individuals, identifying unconstitutional legislative acts where such can
141 Justice Beverly McLachiin, “The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Judicial Perspective”,
The University of British Columbia Law Review, Vo! 23, no. 3, (1989), p. 589
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be demonstrated, and applying the Charter we have all agreed
McLachiin respects the role of the legislative body and does not seek 
to occupy that role. Hercules, by his nature as described by Dworkin, would 
not hesitate to substitute his reasoning and decisions for that of the 
legislature, to as McLachiin writes, “strike the policy compromises that are 
essential to effective modern legislation.” This is something that McLachiin 
recognizes is not the role of courts or judges. Hercules wants to legislate, 
McLachiin wants to interpret and communicate the results of that 
interpretation so that legislatures can legislate. She calls judicial decision­
making a “necessarily a blunt instrument, incapable of achieving the balances 
necessary for a workable law acceptable to society as a whole.” Hercules 
would not agree with that assessment, as he/she would see it as a blunt 
instrument rendered a surgical tool by virtue of his superior ability to wield it. 
While McLachiin may have some deference to the legislature she will not 
allow something that is unfair and clearly against the supreme law of Canada, 
the Constitution, to exist unless it can be justified. It is the method, and goal 
expected from that method, of dealing with the constitutional breach that 
differs in their approaches. There are some examples of this difference that 
illustrate the goals and methods that divide a Hercules from a Herbert, or in 
this case a McLachiin.
In R V. Keegstra McLachiin wrote a dissenting opinion that outlined this 
position. She argued that, even though Keegstra had been accused and
McLachiin, Courts, Legislatures, pp. 71-72
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convicted of spreading hate his Section 11 (d) Charter rights had been
infringed by the state due to the fact that truth is the only defence to making
defaming remarks or spreading hate and this puts the burden on the accused
to prove innocence when it is really the role of the Crown to prove guiltJ"^^
Section 11 (d) allows that a person is innocent until proven guilty in a fair and
public tr\a\V^ In dissenting McLachiin stated that,
Section 319(2) breaches the guarantee of freedom of expression 
enshrined in the Charter. Moreover, the defence provided under s. 
319(3)(a) infringes an accused’s right to be presumed innocent. The 
importance of such objectives as avoiding discrimination, racial 
violence and promoting multiculturalism, is such that a limited and 
measured infringement of free speech may be justifiable under s. 1 of 
the Charter, provided that the means chosen are proportionate. 
However, the broad criminalization of virtually all expression which 
might be construed as promoting hatred effected by s. 319(2) of the 
Criminal Code is not, in my view, a proportionate and appropriate 
means of achieving the ends to which the legislation is directed. The 
breadth of the category of speech it catches, the absolute nature of the 
prohibition it applies to such speech, the draconian criminal 
consequences it imposes coupled with the availability of preferable 
remedies, and finally, the counterproductive nature of its actual effects 
-  all these features of s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code combine to make 
it an inappropriate means of protecting our society against the evil of 
hate propaganda.^'^^
In this case a Hercules may have felt that though there was a technical 
infringement of sections 2(b) (freedom of expression) and 11 (d) of the 
Charter the community standards regarding speech that is unpopular or 
morally offensive would have to be upheld. This would mean that Hercules 
would have upheld the legislation based on the fact that the benefit derived 
from limiting free speech is sufficient. Hercules may recognize the argument
R V. Keegstra (1990) 3 S.C.R., p. 706  
Constitution Act, 1982, p. 60 
R v. Keegstra (1990) 3 S.C.R., pp. 867-868
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made regarding section 11 (d) as problematic. However, this is something 
that he/she could easily overcome if he/she felt that the speaker or writer of 
the offensive material should have to defend the validity of the statements 
made. In a much more broad sense than Hercules’ conception, truth or the 
belief of truth is currently the only clear defence against a defamation charge. 
However, if challenging the accused to defend the truth of the statement is 
carried much farther than a basic questioning of the belief of truth, McLachiin, 
a Herbert, believes that such a tack violates the Chartet’s conception of the 
Crown having to prove guilt and not the accused’s responsibility to prove 
innocence.
In R V. Zundel, McLachiin sided with the majority and wrote the 
decision which struck down Section 181 of the Criminal Code^^^, which 
prohibits spreading of false or defamatory information or “telling tales”, on the 
grounds that it was an unjustifiable limit on the section 2(b) Charter right of 
freedom of exp ress ion .The message from the Court was that expression is 
protected regardless of the information that is being conveyed. McLachiin 
stated that,
(b)efore we put a person beyond the pale of the Constitution, before 
we deny a person the protection which the most fundamental law of 
this land on its face accords to the person, we should, in my belief, be 
entirely certain that there can be no justification for offering 
protection.
Once again, Hercules could argue that the material being conveyed did 
matter insofar as whether or not it offends community morality or standards of
R  I/. Zundel (1992) 2 S.C.R., p. 743 
R V. Zundel (1992) 2 S.C.R., pp. 733-732  
R V. Zunde/(1992) 2 S.C.R., p. 758
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what is acceptable. Hercules would see the offering of the protection of
section 2(b) as a matter of truth and validity of the statements being made. If
he/she feels that the message or speaker is unpopular or offends community
standards then he/she would move to have it excluded from the protections
offered by the Charter. He/she would not need to be “entirely certain that
there can be no justification for offering protection.” He/she would only need
to believe that the Charter ser\/es the will of the community and should be
interpreted as to allow the greatest amount of latitude to exclude speech and
expression rather than, as McLachiin is saying, the greatest amount of
latitude to include speech and expression.
In R V. Sharpe, McLachiin wrote the majority opinion, which stated that
while some of the sections of the Criminal Code that pertain to possession
and distribution of child pornography are useful they are unnecessarily broad
in their application.^"^® This meant that in the case of mere possession in
order for the Crown to justifiably limit Sharpe’s section 2(b) freedom of
expression rights the relevant sections had to be very narrowly applied. The
legislation as written had the potential to be broadly applied and not
defensible as a justified limit on a Charter right.
In f? V. Hall, a 2002 case involving the standards by which bail can be
denied, McLachiin stated that.
The judge must be satisfied that detention is not only advisable but 
necessary. The judge must, moreover, be satisfied that detention is 
necessary not just to any goal, but to maintain confidence in the 
administration of iustice. Most importantly, the judge makes this 
appraisal objectively through the lens of the four factors Parliament has
R  V. Sharpe (2001) 1 S.C.R., p. 45
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specified. The judge cannot conjure up his own reasons for denying 
bail; while the judge must look at all the circumstances, he must focus 
particularly on the factors Parliament has specified. At the end of the 
day, the judge can only deny bail if satisfied that in view of these 
factors and related circumstances, a reasonable member of the 
community would be satisfied that denial is necessary to maintain 
confidence in the administration of justice. In addition, as McEachern 
C.J.B.C. (in Chambers) noted in R. v. Nguyen (1997), 119 0 .0 .0 . (3d) 
269, the reasonable person making this assessment must be one 
properly informed about "the philosophy of the legislative provisions. 
Charter \/a\ues and the actual circumstances of the case" (p. 274). For 
these reasons, the provision does not authorize a "standardless 
sweep" nor confer open-ended judicial discretion.
Hercules could have looked at this case as an opportunity to keep the
discretionary power of granting bail broadly defined and he/she would have
wanted the power to “conjure up his own reasons for denying bail” and couch
them in terms of maintaining confidence in the administration of justice.
Mclachlin, who is a Herbert, defers to the criterion that is laid down by
Parliament through the legislation and by the overarching imperative to
maintain confidence in the administration of justice. She does not seek to
insert her own reasons, even as additional support to the stated
Parliamentary reasons for denying bail, but rather defers to Parliament’s
reasons for doing so. As she stated in Canada (Human Rights
Commissioner) V. Taylor,
Absolute precision in the law exists rarely, if at all. The question is 
whether the legislature has provided an intelligible standard according 
to which the judiciary must do its work. The task of interpreting how 
that standard applies in particular instances might always be 
characterized as having a discretionary element, because the standard 
can never specify all the instances in which it applies. On the other 
hand, where there is no intelligible standard and where the legislature
150 R V. Hall (2002) 3 S.C.R., p. 41
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has given a plenary discretion to do whatever seems best in a wide set 
of circumstances, there is no "limit prescribed by law"/^^
The above decisions illustrate that McLachiin does not mind and, in 
fact, requires that legislation and case law govern the direction that her 
decisions are to go. Hercules, on the other, does not willingly submit to the 
yoke of Parliamentary legislation or case law if there is the opportunity to 
reserve broad power to substitute his decisions and reasons for the 
legislature’s or the precedent contained in the institutional history of the 
courts.
According to Peter McCormick, McLachiin is not the judicial activist
that Lamer CJ was and her court will not be as active as his in these areas
and in fact may beat a hasty retreat in the equality rights area of sexual
o r i e n t a t i o n . A l l  of this suggests that there will be less of the Hercules type
original decisions that employ personal morality and more of a deference to
the institutional history of the Court. In other words, the breaking of new
ground may no longer be the focus of this SCC. Instead the court will focus
on original decisions that are more incremental and that have a strong
support of the body of cases and institutional history they represent. We can
see further proof of this from McLachlin’s own statements. She writes.
It is still very early days for the Canadian Charter. But already we have 
a significant body of jurisprudence fleshing out its guarantees. Future 
decisions will build on this. The first time a Charter pronouncement is 
made that seems to change the law, it may strike many as “activist.” 
But as a body of principle develops, the foundation of court decisions
Canada (Human Rights Commissioner) v. Tayior (1990) 3 S.C.R., pp955-956  
McCormick, Supreme at Last, pp. 159 ,162
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on the words of the Charter and the stable nature of the jurisprudence
will become more apparent/^^
When the above quotes from McLachlin’s academic writings, as well 
as the decisions that she has authored, are examined it seems apparent 
McLachiin is a judge who is more inclined to be like Herbert. Central to 
Herbert style judging is the respect for the doctrine of articulate consistency, 
which we know from Chapter Three means to be able to bring a judicial 
decision within a larger frame of reference or body of precedent, and respect 
for the institutional history of the Court. Madam Chief Justice Beverly 
McLachiin would follow the basic tenets that differentiate Herbert from 
Hercules: Herbert’s respect for institutional history, and the morality contained 
therein, and the embracing of the gravitational force of past decisions in 
deciding hard cases. As opposed to Hercules’s inclination to limit the 
gravitational force in order to come to a decision that is based on some other 
personal or community moral concept of fairness. McLachiin would argue 
that this is an example of the “agenda-driven judging” which she discounts 
above as a “terrible thing” which “could not be tolerated”. This is clear 
indication that she sees the role of judges as limited by the facts in the case 
at hand and the precedent that enshrines the principle being argued. She 
would see the role of a Hercules type judge as more “agenda driven” and 
activist in aggressively advancing rights through decisions that lack the 
gravitational force of precedent.
McLachiin, Courts, Legislatures, p. 71
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It is not the author’s intention to argue that McLachiin and by extension 
her Court, are less interventionist than other previous supreme courts when 
they rule on Charter cases. The nature of jurisprudence is founded on the 
principle that the courts intervene between two, or more, opposing groups. 
The primary function of the judicial branch of government is to be an effective 
check on the power of the legislative and executive bodies who, left 
unaccountable, could pass legislation that would ignore minority concerns 
and leave them with no recourse or appeal. The Madam Chief Justice 
McLachiin is interventionist because that is the job description of a judge, 
especially an appeal court judge. What she, and her Court, is not, however, 
is overly activist. This means that in cases involving the Charter, such as the 
ones mentioned above, McLachiin has consistently acted to protect the rights 
and freedoms that were stated and defined through precedent. This is what 
the author would consider interventionist and, therefore, an expected function 
of the Court.
On the other hand, judicial activism is the creation and extension of 
rights to new groups or individuals. As McCormick writes above, during 
McLachlin’s time as Chief Justice the activist role of the court will be 
diminished. What her own words and actions suggest is that rights that are 
within the Charter are to be respected and only limited in very specific 
incidences.
In Chapter Two, the constitutional weaknesses of the Bill were 
exposed. Further, the Institutional history of the Court with respect to the
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areas of constitutional weakness was also presented. Those weaknesses 
and the accompanying precedent illustrate that the legislation is created to 
limit legal rights contained in the Charter. A case involving a challenge to Bill 
C-36 will not be argued on the basis of extending new rights but of preserving 
long held and fairly clearly defined existing and basic, equality and legal 
rights. Since, as we have seen above, McLachiin is, by her own words and 
actions, a Herbert and she would look at the precedent or institutional history 
of the court with respect to the Cha/ter sections infringed upon by Bill C-36 
and defer to it. In a very real sense, the opportunity to be an activist Court is 
limited because the Executive and Legislature are filling the activist role by 
creating legislation that is an, unprecedented, unjustified limit of Charter 
rights; these are rights that Canadians had previously possessed without the 
encumbrances of Bill C-36. The real question then becomes, as a Herbert 
will she defer to the legislature or the institutional history of the Court? Her 
words and actions suggest that that she will side with the institutional history 
in the case of Bill C-36 because that is all that she can do and still protect the 
legal rights in the Charter. Her words, presented above and reproduced here, 
state.
That is not to say that, where an individual’s constitutional rights are at 
stake, the courts must always accept the compromises the legislators 
work out. Where laws unjustifiably violate constitutional rights, it is the 
clear duty of the courts to so declare, with the result that the offending 
law is to that extent null and void under Section 52 of the Charter. 
Slavish deference would reduce Charter rights to meaningless words 
on a scrap of paper. It is to say, however, that judging should be 
grounded in principle and an appropriate respect for the different roles 
of elected representatives of the people and the courts.
80
Thus far in our Charter’s short history, the courts have repeatedly 
countenanced respect for the choices of Parliament and the 
legislatures. They have repeatedly affirmed that it is not the Court’s 
role to strike the policy compromises that are essential to effective 
modern legislation. The role of the courts is the much more modest 
but nevertheless vital task of hearing constitutional claims brought by 
individuals, identifying unconstitutional legislative acts where such can 
be demonstrated, and applying the Charter we have all agreed 
upon.^ '^^
The essence of McLachiin is that she is a Herbert who is forced, from time to 
time, to act like a Hercules and seem activist in order to protect rights that are 
gained and defined incrementally (through jurisprudence) but are threatened 
by a great leap backwards. This is what the author would argue is the case 
with Bill C-36. In addition, if the power that McCormick believes McLachiin 
possesses is employed it is not unreasonable to assume that she could 
influence the decisions of the other justices of the Supreme Court.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to apply Dworkin’s theory of judicial 
decision-making to the SCC, particularly Chief Justice Beverly McLachiin. 
This in turn allowed us to label her as a Herbert type judge. The result of that 
comparison illustrates that McLachiin wields significant influence over the 
Court and that could mean that McLachlin’s vision of Charter rights may also 
be the entire Court’s vision of Cha/ter rights. That being the case, the Court 
as a whole could then be considered to also be more closely associated with 
Herbert rather than Hercules. This means that the Supreme Court would 
most likely find that several sections of Bill C-36 infringe the Charter lu a
McLachiin, Courts, Legislatures, pp. 71-72
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manner that is not justified in a free and democratic society. Precisely what 
the Court would do after this finding is speculative, but some options are 
presented within the Conclusion.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to argue that if the Supreme Court of 
Canada heard a case involving a Charter challenge of Bill C-36 (the Anti- 
Terrorism Act, 2001) in the context of legal theory, case law and due to the 
character of the court, it would not uphold the law as enacted. Kingdon’s 
model helped to illustrate the policy creation and implementation stage to 
highlight amendments and concerns that were raised at that time. The fact 
that the legislation was passed very quickly does not, in itself, account for the 
flaws in the legislation that were highlighted in Chapter Two- but it also cannot 
be discounted as a contributing factor.
Dworkin’s theory of judicial decision-making was presented in order to 
provide a criterion for categorizing judges and decisions. In Chapter Four that 
criteria was applied to our test case judge Madam Chief Justice Beverly 
McLachiin. This allowed us to suggest that McLachiin is more Herbert than 
Hercules. This means that in a case involving Bill C-36 she would side with 
precedents contained in the institutional history of the courts. In contrast, 
based on Chapter Three’s description, Hercules would seek to control, limit or 
ignore altogether the force that precedent, or institutional history of the Court, 
exerts in a case that turns on an argument of principle. In this case,
Hercules, like McLachiin, would not defer to the legislature and simply uphold 
the legislation as written. Hercules would most likely take a much more 
invasive and proactive approach and strike down or significantly alter, through 
the doctrine of “reading in”, the legislation by substituting his own meaning
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and morality. Remember, Hercules has no qualms about stepping into the 
domain of the legislators because he is able, through his heightened powers 
of deduction, to know the intent of the legislation and the overriding morality 
the is the underpinning of the law. Why send it back to be altered by the 
legislators when it can be done in one mighty stroke of Hercules’ pen. 
McLachiin decries this method or role of judging and would not go so far and 
that is what makes her more like Herbert. They both may decide that 
something is wrong with the legislation but the disposition of the case would 
reflect the level of deference and respect that each has for the legislators and 
the institutional history of the Court.
The principles contained in the precedents that are outlined in Chapter 
Three would require any judge following them to conclude that the limits 
placed on the legal rights in question are not justifiable and as such would fail 
on or more of the tests laid out in R v. Oakes. In the section below the 
“Oakes Test” is explained further in the context of remedy, which was 
developed by the Supreme Court in response to the 1992 case entitled 
Schachter v. Canada.
Remedies Available Under Schachter v. Canada:
Shalom Schachter and his wife had a child in 1985. His wife took 15 
weeks of maternity leave as allowed by the Unemployment Act, 1971 and it 
was Mr. Schachter’s intention to stay home with the child as soon as his wife 
went back to work. He applied for benefits under s.32 (later s.20) of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971 and he was denied benefits because he
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was not an adoptive father. Section 32 (now s.20) of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act, 1971 states that;
Notwithstanding section 25 [now s. 14] but subject to this section, initial 
benefit is payable to a major attachment claimant who proves that it is 
reasonable for that claimant to remain at home by reason of the 
placement with that claimant of one or more children for the purpose of 
adoption pursuant to the laws governing adoption in the province in 
which that claimant resides.
He ultimately took three weeks off work without pay. He appealed to a board
of referees where his appeal was dismissed. He then appealed to an Umpire.
At this point he made it known that he was going to launch a court challenge
in via The Federal Court, Trial Division.
Justice Strayer of the Federal Court agreed that s.32 (s20) of the
Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971 was not compatible with s. 15 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.^^^ The legislation itself was not
unconstitutional but the manner in which it was applied was. Section. 32 of
the Act was under-inclusive in its application. Section 24(1) of the Charter
guarantees a remedy if rights have been infringed and a case has been
brought before the c o u r t s . T h a t  is not to say that a win or positive outcome
for the plaintive is guaranteed in every case. This simply means that there
has to be a decision made, a remedy prescribed which from the standpoint of
either plaintive or the accused may or may not mean a “win.” Under section
52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 if a law is deemed inconsistent with the
Constitution, the Charter included, it is to be declared to have no force or
Schachter V. Canada (1992) 2 S.C.R 690.
Schachter, p. 691.
Schachter, p. 690.
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effect to the extent of the inconsistency/^^ If this is the case there are 
generally two options for the court. The court can strike down the whole 
piece of legislation or the court can sever the offending part of the legislation 
provided the remaining part of the legislation will still have force and value. In 
this case the justice felt that this was not an issue that could be solved by 
striking down the legislation in question since it would not give remedy to Mr. 
Schachter and would deprive those who benefit from the policy. He also felt 
that severing the offending part of the legislation would mean the same thing 
for those who were currently receiving benefit from section 32(s. 20). So in 
order to satisfy the need for an s.24 (1) remedy he “read in” the rights of the 
natural father. This means that s.32 would now include both adoptive and 
natural fathers as being entitled to benefits.
The decision was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal on the 
grounds that Justice Strayer had erred when he provided a remedy under 
s.24 (1) without engaging s.52 (1) and the required tests that would guide the 
disposition of the case.^^® In appeal the court was split on this issue with 
Heald J.A siding with the lower court ruling and the logic contained therein 
and Mahoney J.A who felt that the power to grant relief in this manner was 
outside the power of the court and resided solely with the legislature. 
Mahoney J.A writes in his decision;
Even if the power of a court to legislate by way of a subsection 24(1) 
remedy were found to exist in circumstances which do not entail the 
appropriation of public monies, no such power can be found to exist 
where the remedy appropriates monies from the Consolidated
Schachter, p. 691.
Schachter, p. 692.
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Revenue Fund for a purpose not authorized by Parliament. A 
purposive approach to remedies under subsection 24(1) cannot take a 
court that far.^®°
Clearly Mahoney J.A felt that it was outside the power of the court to “make 
law” because that function of policy making rests with parliament. The case 
was referred to the Supreme Court of Canada on this issue. The justices of 
the Supreme Court of Canada were asked; does the court have the power to 
make law via section 24(1) or does it only have the power to strike down laws 
that are not consistent with the Constitution? In addition, if the SCC found 
that the courts did have the power to “read in” rights to an under-inclusive 
policy it could mean that the constitutionally granted power of making laws 
reserved for the legislative and executive branches of government is no 
longer absolute. The courts could make policy in every case. They would no 
longer simply interpret what is constitutional and what is not.
The Supreme Court Decision
In deciding Schachter the Supreme Court of Canada took the 
opportunity to define what powers the courts have with respect to correct 
disposition of consitutional cases. Any cases that appear before the courts in 
Canada that are argued on the basis of an infringement of Charter rights must 
go through a s.1 test know as the Oakes test. This test helps the court decide 
what remedies are available to them based on the parts of the test that the 
policy in question fails. In the case of Schachter the policy that would be 
required to pass the test would be the U.l Act in general and s.32 (later s.20)
^^°Schachter, p. 693.
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in particular. To better understand the test and the SCC decision in this case 
I will take a moment to explore the elements of the Oakes test.
The Oakes test has two main elements. The first part of the test asks 
the question “is the legislative objective which measures limiting an 
individuals rights or freedoms are designed to serve sufficiently pressing and 
substantial to justify the limitation of those rights or freedoms?” ®^^ This 
means that is the objective of the legislation sufficiently important to limit a 
right. In the case of SchachterXhe policy objective of the U.l. Act was to 
provide a safety net for those who were out of work or who were in need of 
maternity or disability benefits. This need for a safety net was pressing and 
substantial enough to warrant a policy and therefore it would pass the first 
part of the Oakes test. If a policy did not pass the pressing and substantial 
objective part of the Oakes test it would mean that the policy was most likely 
unconstitutional in itself regardless of how it is applied and as Lamer C.J 
wrote; “where the purpose of the legislation is itself unconstitutional, the 
legislation should be struck down in its entirety.” ®^^
The second part of the Oakes test is commonly called the 
proportionality test and it has three parts. The first part is called the rational 
connection test and it requires that a policy be rationally connected to the 
objectives of that policy. In other words, does the policy do what it was 
designed to do. For example, in Sauve v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 
2002 case turned on the issue that section 51 (e) of the Canada Elections Act 
denied prisoners who were serving sentences of two years or more the right
Schachter, p. 703.
Schachter, p. 703.
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to vote.^®  ^Section 3 of the Cha/ter guarantees everyone the right to vote or 
be a member of a legislative assembly/^"^ Section 51(e) was challenged as 
being an unjustified limit on the prisoner’s section 3 rights as well as 
discriminatory under section 15(1) of the Charter. In this case the stated 
legislative objectives of the law were to enhance civic responsibility and 
respect for the rule of law, and to provide additional punishment or enhance 
the general purpose of the criminal s a n c t i o n . T h e  court found that section 
51 (e) was not rationally connected to the stated objectives in the case in that 
“the argument that only those who respect the law should participate in the 
political process cannot be accepted. Denial of the right to vote on the basis 
of attributed moral unworthiness is inconsistent with the respect for the dignity 
of every person that lies at the heart of Canadian democracy and the 
Charter.
The second part of the proportionality test is called minimal 
impairment and it requires that the policy in question impair the right as little 
as possible. An example was provided in the introduction, which explains 
what minimal impairment is and is reproduced here for the sake of clarity.
In R V. Sharpe, a case regarding possession of child pornography, the 
Court felt that even if possession of child pornography is linked to harm to 
children, that harm is fully addressed by laws against the production and 
distribution of child pornography.’ ®^ Criminalizing mere possession adds
Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E2, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1985), s. 51(e). 
Constitution Act, 1982, p. 58.
Sauve V. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) (2002) 218 D.L.R(4) 577 
Sauve V. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) (2002) 218 D.L.R(4) 577  
R V. Sharpe (2001), 1 S.C.R. 45
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greatly to the limitation on free expression but adds little benefit in terms of 
harm prevention. The key consideration is what the impugned section seeks 
to achieve beyond what is already accomplished by other legislation. If other 
laws already achieve the goals, new laws limiting constitutional rights are 
unjustifiable. Therefore, in this instance, criminalizing mere possession was 
not the least drastic means to combat child pornography and as such failed 
the minimal impairment portion of the test.
The third part of the proportionality test is requires that the effects of 
the policy be proportional to the objective identified. This means that the 
policy may pass all other parts of the test but the measures are not in 
proportion to the objective. They may be overly punitive or just not an 
intended effect of the policy. An example of this can be observed in Thomson 
Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1998. At issue in this case 
was the federal legislation (s. 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act) banning the 
publication public opinion survey results on or near the polling date.^ ®® In 
Thomson the court ruled that there was little or no evidence that prohibiting 
the release of polling information affected the outcome of an election and 
preserved a persons right to an informed vote. In addition the court found 
that even if there was a minimal benefit that is realized by banning the release 
of polling data it is outweighed by the significant breach to s.2 Charter 
guarantees of freedom of speech.^®® In this case, the breach of s.2 Charter 
rights was much greater than the benefit realized and therefore not justifiable.
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General) 1998 1 S.C.R. 
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General) 1998 1 S.C.R.
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When looking at Schachter Vne Supreme Court outlined what tools 
would be appropriate to dispose of the case based on what part of the test it 
failed. This was to clarify the power the courts have when dealing with policy 
that is inconsistent with the Charter. While the case was argued on the point 
that the court does not have the power to “make law” by reading into 
legislation that is under inclusive and the SCC held this to be true. The court 
also felt that there is a definite need for “reading in.” They argued that, in 
some cases, reading in would level the playing field when severing and 
striking down, or striking down in total, are not appropriate and would be 
tantamount to eliminating the game altogether. The Lamer C.J. writing for the 
majority argued that rather than s.24 (1) being the source of power for 
“reading in” a right it should be part of the s. 52(1) doctrine of severance and 
a legitimate remedy that would be the least intrusive into the legislative 
domain while still adhering to the spirit of equality of the Charter.^^° From the 
previous sentence we can see that the Court does not see this as making 
law, but more of a way of preserving the spirit of equality within the existing 
laws.
We have already seen above that the court felt that any inconsistency 
with the first part of the Oakes test should result in a law being struck down in 
its entirety. This would also generally be true of the part A of the second part 
of the Oakes test. It would not matter if it passed the pressing and substantial 
objective part because regardless of how pressing and substantial it is if the
Schachter, p. 702.
91
law does not do what it says it will do then it is most likely a bad law in total 
and should be struck down in total.
In order to consider reading in and severance as remedies the policy 
would have to have failed the minimal impairments/effects tests. That would 
mean that there would be only small parts of the policy that were inconsistent 
with the Charter and they could be solved by severing and striking down that 
part as long as the legislation could survive without that part and it could be 
assumed that the legislature would have passed the law without the offending 
part. In the case of Schachter, s.32 could not be severed since it would take 
away the benefits of those it was designed to help, adoptive fathers, without 
providing any remedy for Mr. Schachter who was a natural father. The Court 
would argue that if reading in were a legitimate option under s. 52(1) it could 
be used in a case like this, but then there would be other budgetary concerns 
that have to be addressed. The court chose, in Schachter, to declare a 
suspension of invalidity of s.32 (s.20) of the U. I Act in order to let the 
legislative body solve the problem, which it did even before this case was 
heard by the SCC, and thus avoid the imposing law that would have 
significant budgetary implications. The SCC has laid out what must be 
considered before with reading in or severance should be considered as a 
remedy. This is what dictates the current role of the courts in policy making.
The SCC in ruling on the Schachter case have made a road map for 
themselves and the lower courts to follow when it comes to reading in rights 
or severing and striking down portions of offending policy. For the purpose of
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clarity I will use the headings from the decision and explain what each means 
for the policy-making role of the courts.
Remedial Precision
In order for the court to consider reading in to a piece of legislation it 
has to be able to ascertain what part of the legislation is the offending part 
and what is required by the Constitution to repair it. Lamer C.J writes:
In some cases, the question of how the statute ought to extend in order 
to comply with the Constitution cannot be answered with a sufficient 
degree of precision on the basis of constitutional analysis. In such a 
case, it is the legislature’s role to fill in the gaps, not the court’s.
In other words, if the court cannot see a clear path then it must consider 
severing or outright striking down a piece of legislation and let the legislature 
start over.
Interference with the Legislative objective
There is always the possibility that any ruling by the court will have 
significant budgetary consequences for the legislative body. In some cases it 
will be a ruling that saves money and in others it will cost the legislative 
branch money. The key is that there cannot be an intrusion into the 
legislative area that will substantially change the budget and operation of the 
policy. In the case of a law being passed and a policy formulated that is 
deliberately unconstitutional because the alternative would cost more than the 
legislature was willing to spend the courts would have no problem reading in
171 Schachter, p. 705.
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or striking down the law. The implication for the court’s policy-making role is 
that the legislature must make laws in good faith. The court, even 
McLachlin’s court, would have no qualms about overhauling a law that seems 
to be a deliberate attempt to save money by being unconstitutional.
Change in Significance of the Remaining Portion.
Will the courts decision change the significance of the legislation in 
question? In the case of severance, can the remaining part of the legislation 
survive without the offending part? If it can, does it still mean the same thing 
and still follow the objectives of the policy. The court must also decide 
whether the legislative branch would have passed the remaining portion. If 
not it might have to strike it down in total.
In the case of reading in, it is important to consider the affected group. 
If, for example, the size of the group whose rights the courts are extending 
was smaller than the group already included in the policy it may be possible 
to do so without too much budgetary intrusion. If, on the other hand, the 
group to whom one was extending rights was quite large, such as natural 
fathers, it might be construed as being too much of an intrusion. The 
alternative would be to strike down the legislation in total, which would be at 
least as intrusive as extending rights to make a policy over inclusive.
In the case of SchachterVne legislative objective of this provision is not 
readily discernible. The language of the act would seem to suggest that 
natural fathers were purposely left out of the legislation. In the decision
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Lamer C.J writes that the case is a prime example of when reading in is not 
appropriate when the legislative intention with respect to budgetary issues is
not clear/^^
Policy implications
It is clear from the lessons learned in SchachterXhai the court seeks to 
keep the power to bring laws within the scope of the Constitution by way of 
reading in. They have not done this very often but it does happen from time 
to time. In Vriendthe court read sexual orientation into the Alberta Human 
Rights Act.^^^ This was a case where the legislative body did not want to 
change the legislation for a variety of political reasons and the SCO was 
required to step in to add sexual orientation (into the definition of sex and 
discrimination based on sex) it since it felt that given the choice the legislature 
would not remedy the situation on its own. The court still sees itself as an 
interpretive body but does not feel that it should simply interpret, test and 
strike down legislation without being able ameliorate parts of legislation that 
are unconstitutional by virtue of a poorly drafted section or an under inclusive 
policy. The courts see themselves active members in policymaking. Further, 
they do not feel it is their place to try and take the place of the legislative body 
unless the legislative body refuses to act where there is a need for a policy to 
be extended, as was the case in Vriend.
What will the Court Do?
^^^Schachter, p. 723.
Vriend v. Alberta, 1998 1 S.C.R, p. 493.
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As mentioned above, the course of action that the Court takes is 
largely dependant on what portion of the Bill is being challenged. For 
example, preventative arrest may not come into play in the case of an 
investigative hearing of a person who appeared voluntarily to provide 
information and objects. There may be breach of Charter rights with respect 
to a lawyer, or the arbitrary detention as I have listed above but not 
specifically a breach of all Charter rights. Therefore, the justices of the SCO 
may not, in a single case, look at and rule on all of the different breaches of 
Charter rights outlined in Chapter Two. In any case, any sort of Charter 
challenge will require that the justices do two things.
One, they must first decide if the legislation in question. Bill C-36, limits 
a right that is guaranteed in the Charter. In this case, the legislation does limit 
Charter rights, that is with the goal of protecting Canada from terrorist attack 
and arrest and detention of know terrorists.
Second, the SCC then must decide if that limit to the concrete right is 
justified by applying the section 1 test laid out in R v. Oakes. It is here that 
Bill C-36 will fail. As was presented in Chapter Two, the legislation contains 
some serious problems. Further, the cases listed above illustrate that the 
Courts have ruled extensively on how far each right can be limited. The 
principle that is affirmed in the institutional history as well as the gravitational 
force brought to bear on the case involving Bill C-36 compels the Court to 
follow precedent rather than ignoring its, and lower courts, interpretation of 
what can limit concrete rights.
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If the Court decides that there Is a breach of some portion of the Oakes 
test they have several options, which are largely contextual. Table I, below, 
indicates what remedies are available based on the Sc/iacbter decision.
Table I
Remedies Available under the Oakes Test
Remedy Option 1 Other Remedy Options
Part 1 : Is the objective 
pressing and 
substantial?
If not, the legislation 
would be struck down in 
total.
Part 2 (a): Is the 
legislation rationally 
connected to the 
objective?
If not, it may be struck 
down in total or;
Sever and strike the 
offending portion of the 
legislation if the 
remaining portion can 
survive. If it can’t, see 
option 1.
Part 2(b) Does the 
legislation constitute a 
minimal impairment on 
the right?
If not, then severance, 
or declaration of a 
suspension of Invalidity 
for a specified period of 
time or;
“Reading in” or “reading 
up” if Option one is not 
appropriate.
Part 2(c) Is the Effect of 
the measure 
Proportional to the 
objective of the 
legislation?
If not, depending on the 
gulf between the 
measure and legislative 
objective severance, or 
declaration of a 
suspension of Invalidity 
for a specified period of 
time or;
Reading in” or “reading 
up” if Option one is not 
appropriate.
The Court could decide to strike down the entire statute. That probably will 
not happen since there are many well conceived provisions in the Bill outside 
the ones listed above. The Court could suspend the invalidity of the offensive 
section of the statute for a specified period to allow the legislative branch to 
correct the mistake that the case at bar has unearthed. This might happen
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since McLachlln is partial to having a dialogue with the legislature. Finally, 
the Court could sever the offensive portions of the legislation and strike them 
down. This depends on what portion and, generally speaking, if the 
legislature would have passed the Bill without the offending portion.
The Bill can survive without the sections that grant extraordinary 
powers to limit legal rights. However, it would really depend on what portion 
of the Bill is being challenged. Suspension of invalidity could be equally 
attractive if there was some chance that the legislation could be reformed 
slightly to bring it into line with the Charter.
The most likely courses of action would be either a suspension of 
declaration invalidity or sever/strike of the offensive portions. However, this 
would also depend on the timing of the case at hand as there is a review date 
for the investigative hearing and preventative arrest portions of the Bill which 
were part of the committee amendments presented in chapter one. This date 
would be December 2006 and if the House of Commons to did not resolve to 
continue these portions they would “sunset” and cease to have force or effect. 
Therefore, if a case was at bar it may be that the Court would suspend the 
invalidity of the portions because it was about to sunset anyway. However, 
since the case at bar in this thesis is hypothetical we will assume that it is 
happening now and not three years from now near the review date.
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Possible législative response
If the courts found the legislation to be an unjustified limit of a Charter 
right and prescribed a remedy above what would be the reaction of the 
legislative branch of government? The reaction would depend on two things. 
One, if there were several cases in progress that were deemed important or if 
there has been a duplication of the principle in other areas of criminal law and 
there are important cases at stake; it may be that the legislative branch would 
re-enact the legislation with a notwithstanding clause attached.
Section 33 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the notwithstanding clause) 
affirms legislative supremacy and allows for legislation that is inconsistent 
with sections 2, and 7 through 15 of the Charter Xo be enacted 
notwithstanding the inconsistency. This can be enacted for a period of 5 
years at which time it would “sunset” and cease to have force. That is, 
unless the government involved, in this case the federal government, re­
enacts the legislation through reso lu t ion .S ince  the sections on legal rights, 
the rights that Bill C-36 mostly infringe upon, are contained in sections 7 
through 14 of the Charter th\s could be an option that may be considered. 
Revisiting the Reasons this Thesis is Valuabie
In the introduction I presented some reasons that this thesis is valuable 
and why anyone should care. In light of the issues that the thesis has raised, 
these reasons are reproduced and expanded upon below.
Constitution Act, 1982, p. 66.
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This research is important for at least four reasons. One, a review of 
Bill C-36 has had only minimal treatment by academia.^^^ The main reason 
for this is that there have been no cases involving Bill C-36 to analyze and 
academics have reserved judgment until such time as there is more concrete 
information to study. This thesis will be one of the first analyses of the 
legislation and its impact on Charter rights albeit devoid of a real Charter 
challenge to analyze.
Two, if our Charter rights are important to us as citizens then studying 
the ramifications that this legislation has on several of those rights is also 
important. Limiting rights in order to secure protection and order is something 
that should not be taken lightly. In the case of Bill C-36 this thesis will give a 
snapshot of what may happen if there is a challenge to the legislation with the 
additional advantage of dealing with several diverse sections of both the 
Charter and the legislation. The judicial system is such that problems with Bill 
C-36 would most likely not be dealt with in a single, or perhaps in multiple, 
court challenges. It would be improbable that a single case would come 
along that would allow the Courts to make decisions on all of the offending 
portions of the legislation. The power that the Courts’ possess is reactive 
power, which requires them to be asked to decide the constitutionality of 
legislation. As it is unlikely that the Court could render a decision on all of the 
problematic provisions of the legislation, this thesis vests the Court with the 
proactive power to decide on all of the portions of the legislation that are
Daniels, Ronald J., Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach, eds. The Security of Freedom: 
Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Biii. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001)
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incompatible with the Charter in one hypothetical instance in order to yield a 
coherent decision.
Third, this thesis is important because it sets out two rational models 
that can be employed in a policy analysis of any piece of legislation.
However, despite employing these rational models, the end result of 
jurisprudence may well turn out to be irrational. It may well be that even after 
using Kingdon’s model to do a careful policy analysis of a piece of legislation 
it is still possible that the legislation, created with logical and rational steps 
could end up being irrational in practice. The same can be said about the 
Dworkin’s theory, it is possible that judges will ignore institutional history 
despite their leanings toward a Hercules or Herbert and deliver a an irrational 
decision. In the case of Bill C-36, it would require Madam Chief Justice 
Beverly McLachlin to ignore her own tendency to be a Herbert, to ignore the 
institutional history that she helped create in upholding the provisions of the 
legislation that are un-justified limits on legal rights, as outlined in Chapter 
Three. This uncertainty of rationality bears greatly on the fourth point that, 
policies are not mere words on paper; they have real effect in the real world. 
Policy makers need to understand that when they contemplate and create 
policy through whatever policy instruments they choose, they are not simply 
pushing paper but creating the moral and social framework that Canadians 
live in. The function of all three branches of government, legislative, judicial 
and executive, is to work together in a dynamic relationship of shifting power 
roles to create the best policy possible. Policy makers must understand that
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they are as much protectors of rights and freedoms as courts and judges are. 
As such, they have a duty to ensure that legislation limits rights freedoms as 
little as possible to satisfy their legislative objective. If they abandon this 
fundamental function or they, for whatever reason, do it poorly the courts are 
there to protect the rights of Canadians. Because, there are sometimes 
irrational decisions made by the legislative and executive branches of 
government, the courts are there for Canadians. When one falters, the others 
are designed to be there to step in.
However, when the judicial branch of government comes up with an 
irrational decision the legislative and executive branches must be there as 
well; but they only have a limited ability to correct judicial mistakes. It is far 
better that policy makers get it right the first time than risk legislation being 
brought before the courts, where an irrational decision that serves no 
legislative or social objective is possible. It is the legislative and executive 
branch’s job to legislate; this thesis is an example of what can happen when 
they do that job hastily and poorly.
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Summary
One may wonder, what the federal government would use as a review 
criteria for the legislation at the five year review date if there have been no 
cases brought forward. While there have been preventative arrests that are 
affected in the name of national security most of those have immigration 
implications and as such are done under powers provided in the Immigration 
Act and result in deportation. Most recently a Montreal area teacher was 
arrested on a warrant signed by Solicitor-General Wayne Easter and 
Immigration Minister Denis Coderre for allegedly belonging to an al-Qaeda 
cell.176
While it seems unlikely, if no cases are prosecuted under the Anti- 
Terrorism Act, 2001 it may well be that the hypothetical case(s) alluded to in 
this thesis are the only ones that will challenge the Act on its constitutional 
(de)merits. If that turns out to be the case it may be fortunate for Canadians 
of all races and origins, as our position as agents over our own rights remains 
secure and we may have dodged a potential bullet. It is a bullet that the 
United States has just started to bite with the “Patriot Act”, passed in 2001, 
and the so-called “Patriot Two”. The citizens of the United States who hold 
freedom so dear have realized in the fullness of time that crisis is often the 
mother of timely, but ill conceived, policy. They have also learned what I 
hope Canada already realizes. Ben Franklin was correct when he said,
“those that would give up freedom for security deserve neither.
Stewart Ball and Graeme Hamilton. “Terror suspect alleges ‘witch hunt’: Moroccan 
arrested in Montreal linked to al-Qaeda: CSIS” National Pos,t 23 May 2003
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